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Abstract:
The further from 9/11, the more vivid its scares remain in the collective conscience.
This seems to justify perhaps what has become a persistent state of a global war on terror. A
war which in turn has given rise to a persistent surge of violent extremists with resolve for a
perpetual state of global warfare. Consequently, now more than before, there is everywhere a
shared sense of insecurity and a parallel awareness of vulnerable statehood and state capacity. I
argue in this article that the current state of affairs has serious implications for statehood, state
responsibility, state obligation and state duties in various forms and spheres of meaningful
governance. I reassess how the principles of State responsibility and State duty can be
meaningfully understood in light of current global security challenges to common notion of
State monopoly to the use of force. I ask how culpability can be assessed and responsibility
attributed to bring to end the scourges of terror by violent extremists. To that end, I explore
practices, events, and cases to supply explanations and thus, lay conditions for accountability.

Introduction
During war and peace times, there is a question of State responsibility
and what obligation sovereign States must legitimately and morally shoulder.
This is particularly true during the so-called ‘war on terror;’ a war lacking the
conventional warfare framework where the enemies, the Violent non State actors
(VNSA), are illusive, and unpredictable with the capacity to morph into different
forms in different contexts. Terror or terrorism, the object, is highly contested
as lacking in an academic or political consensus in terms of definition.58 Is it an
idea, an ideology or a barbaric strategy in posture? Be it as it may in the face of
all of the upsurge in terrorist extremist activities in since 9/11, concerns have
been raised about the increased vulnerability of the State; Statehood as well as
its diminished coercive capacity. Sure enough, the continuous state of the global
war on terror post 9/11 has not been helpful; instead it has ushered in with it an
ambiguous sense of security.

See Wilkinson, Paul (1977) Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan. To Paul
Wilkenson, a proclaimed expert on terrorism conceives of “terrorism in its broadest sense, as the
use of intentionally indiscriminate violence - the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction or threat
of same -- as a means to create terror or fear, in order to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.”
58
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In the international community, what once was a sovereign State’s
enduring claim to the monopoly of the use of force within territorial borders is
today highly contestable, and to a large measure, is in jeopardy. From so-called
failed states to the most powerful, there is no exception. In that sense the score
card on the effort of contemporary domestic and international counter-terrorism
goals, in the long haul, prompt more questions than the answers supplied. One
of these questions is whether the all or nothing claim in the fight against
terrorism has made the world a safer place today than yesterday. The continued
mayhem caused by extremists, the Al-Qaeda of yesterday, ISIS of today and their
extended affiliates around the world, and the new global jihadist59 insurgent
types such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)60 in Syria and Iraq, BokaAram in Nigeria and Northern Cameroon, to name but a few, speaks volumes to
any conclusion one may draw of a safer world, today.
The recent movement by the United States to exclude persons, and
justifications supplied to ban visitations and immigration from those parts of the
world, speaks to the felt sense of global insecurity from the US perspective, and
more importantly, to the confusion in sorting the appropriate measures for
accountability. It also undoubtedly speaks to a corresponding vulnerability in
the US capacity to properly counter precise dangers posed perhaps by
immigrants apart from the violent extremists from these parts of the world.61
Section 2 of the Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017 provides that: “It is
the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from foreign nationals who
intend to commit terrorist attacks in the United States; and to prevent the
admission of foreign nationals who intend to exploit US immigration laws for
malevolent purposes.”
Recent Global Terrorism Index death statistics of terrorist attacks and
fatalities show increase in terrorist activity by 80% in 2014 to its highest
recorded level to date.62 This colossal in that, it is the largest ever year-on-year
increase in deaths from terrorism recorded in 2014, rising from 18,111 in 2013
to 32,685 in 2014. Indeed, the number of people who have died from terrorist
activity has increased nine-fold since the year 2000. With a much refined source
of terror of “non-state terrorism” recorded, the Global Terrorism Database
The new insurgent types would be the global jihadist movements groups made of non-state
actors composed of al Qaeda-affiliated and -inspired groups and individuals who see Al Qaeda
not only as an organization but also as an ideology.
60 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL),
currently controls about one-third of Iraq and Syria. They are a combination of: (a) revival of
the al-Qaeda-sponsored Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) organization that tried to take over western
Iraq 2003—2006, and Sunni Syrian rebel groups including the Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra),
which also has ties to al Qaeda, see Shoshana Bryen and Michael Johnson “TO KNOW YOUR
ENEMY: What is ISIS, Where did it Come From, and When Did the US Know it was There?”
http://chainsoff.wordpress.com/2014/08/26/
61 See Executive Order 13769 of January 27, 2017, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry into the United States”
“https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/01/2017-02281/...
62 LaFree G. (2012) Generating Terrorism Event Databases: Results from the Global Terrorism
Database, 1970 to 2008. In: Lum C., Kennedy L. (eds) Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy.
Springer Series on Evidence-Based Crime Policy, vol 3. Springer, New York, NY
59
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provides that more than 61,000 incidents resulted in 140,000 deaths between
2000 and 2014.63 As depicted in Table 1A, of the 37 deaths from terrorism in
Western countries in 2014, 18 fatalities took place in the United States in that
year alone. In the eight other countries that reported a fatal terrorist attack,
there were a combined total of 19 deaths from terrorist attacks.
Table 1A – Deaths from Terrorist Attacks in Western Countries in 2014
Table 1.a

Country

Deaths from Terrorist Attacks in Western Countries in 2014
Deaths
Attacks Country
Deaths

Attacks

1

United States

18

19

13

Germany

0

12

2

Australia

4

7

14

Italy

0

7

3

Canada

4

2

15

Sweden

0

6

4

Belgium

4

1

16

Cyprus

0

4

5

Kosovo

2

1

17

Bosnia Herzegovina

0

3

6

Austria

2

1

18

Macedonia

0

3

7

1
1

11
3

19

8

France
Czech Republic

20

Spain
Bulgaria

0
0

3
1

9

Albania

1

2

21

Hungary

0

1

10

United Kingdom

0

102

22

Iceland

0

1

11

Ireland

0

30

23

Netherland

0

1

12

Greece

0

26

Total # of Deaths in 2014 = 37
Total # of Attacks = 254
As depicted on this table, of the 37 deaths from terrorism in Western countries in 2014, 18 fatalities took place in the United States
in that year alone. In the eight other countries that reported a fatal terrorist attack, there were a combined total of 19 deaths
Source: Culled from, Global Terrorism Index 2014, and compiled by author (M.G. Pufong)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation bulletin with focus on the United States with
implications around the world reports that terrorist extremists such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and
affiliated groups to include other Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE), continue to
attempt terroristic attacks on the US homeland. New tactics and tradecraft, the FBI report
observes, have emerged which further complicates the innumerable threats facing the
United States.64 The FBI report seemingly hinges on whether the reported terrorist threats
63 See The Global Terrorism Database (GTD): a database of incidents of terrorism from 1970
onward to 2017 maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, College Park. It is also the
basis for other terrorism-related measures, such as the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) published
by the Institute for Economics and Peace.
64 See Lauren B. O’Brien, “The Evolution of Terrorism Since 911,” The FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, (2011) http://www.fbi.gov /stats-services/publications/law-enforcementbulletin/september-2011/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11, Accessed June 8, 2012 and
October 2, 2017
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were domestic to the United States and therefore unique, or international and therefore
widespread and global. A 2010 study by Seung-Whan Choi (2010) presented causal
explanation that tends to dampen the domestic terror source hypothesis. Choi suggests
instead that “because ordinary citizens can peacefully resolve grievances through
democratic rule of law systems, they lack the hopelessness and desperation that motivates
international terrorist actions.”65 Consequently, from that view, legitimately held rule of
law systems serve to insulate democracies from terrorist attacks from within.66
Choi therefore invites a thinking that differentiates the impact of terrorism into
brands or types (i.e., home grown extremists versus international violent extremists) and
political systems (i.e., democratic versus non-democratic or authoritarian regimes). In
that view, “home grown domestic extremists” is a category quite distinct from
“international terrorism.” Yet terrorist attacks of the kind of 9/11 and most recently ISIS’s
gruesome targets in France and Belgium and before that Western journalists in Iraq and
Syria, suggest the predominance and magnitude of trans-border flow of persons and to a
larger extent, of terrorist groups. That is, it is possible to imagine that the ease of traveling
from one point to another may exacerbate the movement of persons and also conclude
that it may also facilitate the formation and movement of terror groups as well. For all its
positives, “openness” and therefore the increased freedom in the movement of persons
across borders, fosters opportunities for terrorist activities predisposed with insidious
motives to destabilize international peace and security. This conclusion is not only critical
but also controversial, as it invokes serious reconsiderations that are more likely to
undermine than foster the free movements of persons.
This article focuses on the global impact of terror unleashed by Violent non-State
Actors [VNSA]. It examines linkages between the principles of state responsibility,
statehood and sovereignty, especially how these concepts can be properly understood in
light of challenges posed by VNSAs within the rapid shifts in State practices in the post
9/11 era. It questions whether statehood, an inherent aspect of a State, and therefore
conferring sovereignty - a state’s ultimate liberty to define, as it sees fit, its domestic
structures and more. To that end, the article contemplates (a) conditions under which
States can be held responsible for their direct wrongful actions; and (b) conditions under
which host States can be held responsible for acts of those that use their territories as safehaven to lunch attacks on other States or groups especially where they fail to act or
incapable of doing so.
While the attribution of responsibility to a State for its direct action may be less
complicated, attribution to a State for acts of a third party, for example, a Violent nonState Actors (VNSA) party is almost always controversial. By definition VNSAs are
elusive organizations that utilize illegal violence as the primary means to achieve political
goals. These may include the use of unsanctioned forces which complicates any direct
attribution of responsibility under the theory of Sate responsibility. As argued below, the
continued growth of terrorist organizations since 9/11 suggests more, and not less anxiety
among those who are the primary target States, notably the United States, Israel, and most
European countries. Since 2001, the US Department of State Office of Counterterrorism
has documented well over fifty groups and organizations as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) with well-known attack agendas against western interests (see
Table 1b and c).67 Amongst those designated FTOs, ten at the very least have for avowed
Seung-Whan Choi. "Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law” (2010) 54 Journal of
Conflict Resolution, (6) 840-966
66 See Note 8 Seung-Whan Choi (2010: 941).
67 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (January 27, 2012). "Foreign Terrorist
Organizations." www.state.gov. U.S. State Department.
65
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purpose and dedication the elimination of the State of Israel, or to replace Israel with a
Palestine Islamic State using violence at their primary vehicle. The remaining forty FTOs
on the list pursue a similar agenda but directed to other targets all over the world.
Astonishingly, from a much broader scale, the US Department of State Office of
Counterterrorism also reports that over the past years there was a total of 6,771

terrorist attacks worldwide which resulted in more than 11,000 deaths and more
than 21,600 injuries. In addition, more than 1,280 people were kidnapped or taken
hostage during the same period.68
Table 1B – Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Table
1.b

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)*
(Non-State Actors)
**As of October 2017**
Date

Group

Date

Designated

Group

Designated

1

10/8/1997

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

32

12/17/2004

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly al-Qa'ida in Iraq)

2

10/8/1997

Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)

33

6/17/2005

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

3

10/8/1997

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

34

3/5/2008

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

4

10/8/1997

Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG)

35

3/18/2008

al-Shabaab

5

10/8/1997

HAMAS

36

5/18/2009

Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

6

10/8/1997

Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

37

7/2/2009

Kata'ib Hizballah (KH)

7

10/8/1997

Hizballah

38

1/19/2010

al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

8

10/8/1997

Kahane Chai (Kach)

39

8/6/2010

Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)

9

10/8/1997

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel)

40

9/1/2010

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

10

10/8/1997

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

41

11/4/2010

Jundallah

11

10/8/1997

National Liberation Army (ELN)

42

5/23/2011

Army of Islam (AOI)

12

10/8/1997

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

43

9/19/2011

Indian Mujahedeen (IM)

13

10/8/1997

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

44

3/13/2012

Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)

14

10/8/1997

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF)

45

5/30/2012

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

15

10/8/1997

PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

46

9/19/2012

Haqqani Network (HQN)

16

10/8/1997

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

47

3/22/2013

Ansar al-Dine (AAD)

17

10/8/1997

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front

48

11/14/2013

Boko Haram

(DHKP/C)
18

10/8/1997

Shining Path (SL)

49

11/14/2013

Ansaru

19

10/8/1999

al-Qa’ida (AQ)

50

12/19/2013

al-Mulathamun Battalion

20

9/25/2000

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

51

1/13/2014

Ansar al-Shari'a in Benghazi

21

5/16/2001

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)

52

1/13/2014

Ansar al-Shari'a in Darnah

22

12/26/2001

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

53

1/13/2014

Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia

23

12/26/2001

Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT)

54

4/10/2014

ISIL Sinai Province (formally Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis)

24

3/27/2002

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)

55

5/15/2014

al-Nusrah Front

25

3/27/2002

Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)

56

8/20/2014

Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)

26

3/27/2002

al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

57

9/30/2015

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al Naqshabandi (JRTN)

27

8/9/2002

Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's

58

1/14/2016

ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K)

28

10/23/2002

Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

59

5/20/2016

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's Branch in Libya (ISIL-Libya)

29

1/30/2003

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

60

6/30/2016

Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent

30

3/22/2004

Ansar al-Islam (AAI)

61

8/16/2017

Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)

31

7/13/2004

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Army

Source: US Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong).

Criteria for FTO Designation:

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm., Accessed June 8, 2017; Also see most
resent posting for September 2017 on Table 1b and 1c.
68 See National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of
Statistical Information, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism “Country Reports on
Terrorism 2012-17,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2017/210017.htm, Assessed October
1, 2017.
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The Legal Criteria for group Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended in 2004 requires that (1) the organization
upon which a FTO designation is visited upon is a foreign organization. (2) the organization must engage in terrorist activity, as
defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent
to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (3) the organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of
U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
Identification and Designation:
For identification and designation purposes, the Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors
the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential
targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged
in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.
Designation:
Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically
including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been
satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make
the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the
designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action
to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes
effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.
Unlike before when the INA provided that FTOs had to be re-designated every 2 years or the designation would lapse, under the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) 2004, re-designation is done only by review and revocation
procedures.

Table 1C – Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)**

Table 1.c
Date Removed from

Name

Designated Listing

Date Originally Designated

1

10/8/1999

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction

10/8/1997

2

10/8/1999

Khmer Rouge

10/8/1997

3

10/8/1999

Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents

10/8/1997

4

10/8/2001

Japanese Red Army

10/8/1997

5

10/8/2001

Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement

10/8/1997

6

5/18/2009

Revolutionary Nuclei

10/8/1997

7

10/15/2010

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

10/8/1997

8

9/28/2012

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

10/8/1997

9

5/28/2013

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

10/11/2005

10

7/15/2014

United Self Defense Forces of Colombia

9/10/2001

11

9/3/2015

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)

10/8/1997

12

12/9/2015

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

12/17/2004

13

6/1/2017

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

10/8/1997

**Delisting/Revocation of FTO Designation
The act of delisting or revocation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) designation under the US Immigration and Nationality Act has
three possible basis: First, that Secretary of State has determined that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed
in such a manner as to warrant a revocation; second, that the Secretary of State has determined that the national security of the United
States warrants a revocation; and thirdly, that the Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time. Further, that Any revocation
shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The
revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such
revocation.
Source: US Department of State. Bureau of Counterterrorism, October 2017, reassembled by author (M.G. Pufong)

Methodology, Application & Outline
The methodological approach adopted in this article for assessment is primarily
analytical and explanatory. Specifically, I use international incidents that depict State
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practices, events, and court cases as case studies to explain outcome consistency or
inconsistency with prevailing principle, practices and international norms. So for
example, an invasion targeting the capture or to neutralize a Violent Non-State Actor
under this approach would invite inquiry into many features of the context or the invasion
in light of prevailing international principles. Elsewhere, Riesman and Willard (1988)
confirm the relevance of using incidents as method of assessment. Riesman and Willard
argue that “incidents” frame the international disputes that shapes and reinforces elite
expectations about the lawfulness of acts for which the appraisal of the relevance of
international actors occurs in a non-formal setting.”69
In the first and second parts of this article I provide summary explanations
associated with how one should understand the link between Statehood and State
responsibility as important principles under international law. Both principles are further
reiterated and their consequences made relevant in subsequent assessments of incidents of
State behavior, practices, cases, and events on State responsibility. The third part of the
article focuses on the principle of sovereignty and its practical implications for nation
states. Specifically, I explore circumstances under which sovereignty may or may not
confer to States the absolute right that absolve them from wrongful acts. Particular
attention is directed to states that harbor violent terrorist groups.
The article concludes that under narrow circumstances, where a conduct or an
incident can be attributed to a specific State – its actions or failure to act – international
law and politics permits the use of force for its wrongful acts or for the acts of a violent
non-State actor (VNSA) under its jurisdiction or control. Absent direct acknowledgment
of responsibility for the initial transgression or the attribution of responsibility that links
or inculpates the host State, the use of force is likely only where the host State is unable
or unwilling to remove the source-of-threat from its territory.
The last part of the article on the targeted use of drones and the invasion of
Pakistan set forth the justification for permissible use of force. Specifically this section
argues that the invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan’s territory falls under
the latter “unwilling” category and therefore triggered the permissible use of force by the
United States. Above all, this article argues that under current status quo, any diminished
impact on the State sovereign capacity and more important in terms of cost associated
with the increased measures taken to avert global terrorism, is offset by rival gains in the
long term security. This is particularly true for the international community absent the
initial source-of-threat to its stability.
Explaining Statehood and State Responsibility
The most prominent form of violent conflict in the world today occurs within
States rather than between them. Since 1945, over 75% of militarized disputes have been
civil conflicts, i.e., non-international armed wars.70 With the increase in terrorist
extremists (VNSA), who use domestic structure of States as safe-havens to launch attacks
on other States, it triggers questions of distinctions and clarification of this important
Michael Riesman and Andrew R Willard, International Incidents: The Law That Counts in
World Politics, (Princeton University Press 1998), vii-viii.
70 Nils Petter Gleditsch; Håvard Strand; Mikael Eriksson; Margareta Sollenberg & Peter
Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict 1946–99: A New Dataset,” Paper presented at the 42nd Annual
Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 20–24 February 2001.
69
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principle in international law and politics. To understand what really is State
responsibility requires foremost that we disentangle what constitutes Statehood.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Right and Duty of States which sets out the
definition, rights, and duties of statehood is particularly instructive here.71 It outlines the
four elements required for the claim of statehood that heretofore has been recognized as
an accurate statement of customary international law. Inherent in them are specific
attributes a State must possess, and which upon doing so, sets forth the basis for State
responsibility. Accordingly, these attributes require that a state possesses (a) a welldefined territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) a government or an effective rule within
the territory; and (d) independence or the competence to conduct international relations.
In fact, these attributes differentiate States from so-called non-State actors or units such
as belligerent communities (e.g., rebel groups), domestic protectorates (e.g., Indian
nations), international organizations etc. As shown in this article, the essence of
statehood also conveys statuses that are associated with the various sets of rights and
duties, and carry with them obligations and jurisdictional competences. While the
Montevideo attributes have traditionally been viewed as legitimate standards that State
must possess, serious debate between the constitutive and declarative views of statehood
persists.72
More recently, David Miller argued that the rights over territory standardly
claimed by states can be separated into three main elements: the right of jurisdiction, the
right to the territory's resources, and the right to control borders.73 Arguably, statehood
and its derivative rights and duties under international law create a framework for extant
State responsibility. According to the 2001 (final) “Article on the Responsibility of States…”
the principle of State responsibility embraces the conception that State rights and duties
must be respected. It outlines the conditions under which violators will be held to account
for their action or inactions, as well as the consequences that flow from committing
wrongs that violate State rights. It links wrongful acts to the direct State actions or to
those that are indirectly the result of State inaction (ARSIWA, 2001).
By connecting breach of rights and duties (norms) with responsibility and
sanctions for breaches, State responsibility in the end forms the basis for implementing
international law and obligation. For example, Article 1 of all four Geneva Conventions is
a key provision when it comes to determining State responsibilities under international
humanitarian law (IHL).74 It provides that states are responsible to “respect and ensure
respect” for the Conventions in all circumstances. To respect, means that all state
See the "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,” Montevideo, Uruguay,
December 26, 1933 Accessed Oct, 2017.
72 For the constitutive basis of state see the 1815 Final Acts, Congress of Vienna and for the
declarative basis of statehood and also see the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States, 1933. For further discussion, see Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law,
(Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1958) and Hans Kelsen, Principles of International
Law, (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc 1952).
73 See David Miller, Territorial Rights: Concept and Justification. (2012) 60 Political Studies,
252–268.
74 The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949. Article 2 Convention (IV) relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. International Committee of the Red Cross,
Geneva, 153-221, http://www.icrc. org/ihl.nsf/WebList? Read Form&id=380&t=com>
Accessed November 25, 2017.
71
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institutions, and all other individuals or bodies under their authority follow the rules of
the Geneva Conventions.75
Article 1 however, seems to apply only to traditional State actors. The lack of the
requisite attributes of statehood perhaps explains the lack of inclusion of non-state actors
who even though very elusive, are also prevalent on the international stage through
various trans-border activities. Also, the lack of territorial jurisdiction suggests that nonState actors cannot absorb direct responsibility as understood under the traditional
meaning of state responsibility. A question of significant interest for State responsibility,
therefore, is under what circumstances can the wrongful act of a purely non-State actor
be attributed to a traditional State actor as the host of a country where the action or
wrongful act occurred?76
To establish that state responsibility, the outcome of state action and therefore a
consequence of statehood, is explained below. I further discuss other practical situations
that may apply to the principles of State responsibility using case opinions of the
International Court of Justice, the international arbitration tribunals, and human rights
courts. Finally, I provide a comprehensive understanding of the main principles of the
law of State responsibility as an enforcement mechanism in international law, short of
other options such as the use of force.
State Responsibility as a Consequence of Statehood
What is the link between state responsibility, state action, and statehood? The
concept of statehood is central in establishing what in modern understanding is a State,
and therefore whether a State by its actions or omissions breaches an international
obligation, and incurs international responsibility. This assumes first and foremost that
the State indeed, is authentic. The responsibility incurred is said to be either derived or
is a consequences to its status and act(s) committed or omitted. Therefore the concept of
statehood confers the status of a legal person and a subject under international law. As
discussed below under attribution, this is an important concept because any attribution
of State responsibility requires a determination based on specific attributes that a State
must possess.77
Beyond framing the rights and duties of statehood, the Montevideo Convention
of 1933 establishes basic criteria that a State must possess to be recognized as a person
under international law (See Section III above). These requirements are: a permanent
population; a defined territory; a government; and lastly, the capacity to enter into
relations with other states.78 By this action, the Convention effectively codified what is
famously known as the declarative theory of statehood. It is this conception of Statehood
that paved the way to the recognition of State responsibility as further grounds upon
See The Geneva Conventions, see Note 17 above.
Shultz, Richard H, Douglas Farah, Itamara V. Lochard. (2004). "Armed Groups: A Tier-One
Security Priority". INSS Occasional Paper (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF
Academy) (57) September http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/ocp57.pdf Accessed November
25, 2017.
77 Again, recall that these attributes owe their formal origin from the Montevideo Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States as agreed to and signed into effect by member states on
December 26, 1933. See Montevideo Convention, see Note 14 above
78 See note 14
75
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which a State can be held liable for certain conduct. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention
for example, explicitly provides that "The political existence of a state is independent of
recognition by the other states.”79
The declarative theory of Statehood was further sustained in 1991 by the EEC
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (commonly known as Badinter
Arbitration Committee) which held that a state is defined by having a territory, a population,
and a political authority.80 Its practical usefulness lies in the assertion that a State exists
by law (de-jure), even if such a State (1) lack one of the attributes, or (2) some politically
powerful entity elects not to recognize its existence. The State of Palestine today is the
clearest example yet. It is recognized by many countries, but it does not have control
over its claimed of the territory in Palestine and in spite of recent claims and movements
in the United Nations’ towards statehood.81 That remains the case even if it has
extraterritorial instrumentalities such embassies and consulates.82
The declarative theory of statehood however, is in sharp contrast to the constitutive
theory which steadfastly endorses the view of “recognition” as a primary requirement for
statehood. The constitutive theory defines a State as a person under international law if, and
only if, it is also recognized as a sovereign state by other states, especially the great powers.83
Justification for this view is found in the logic that because new states cannot immediately
become part of the international community or be bound by international law, the existing
recognized nations do not have to respect international law in dealings with nonrecognized States.
So as stated above, if state responsibility is a natural consequence of state
statehood, being a state in either a de-jure or de-facto sense, is an important first step.
Once it is established that statehood actually exists, and how it exists, under either the
declarative or constitutive theory, it paves way to a fuller narrative of State responsibility.
A showing that statehood exists in a particular instance therefore is foremost. Only upon
doing so can a State be held to be liable for any purported wrongful act. According to
Article 1 of the 2001 (final) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (ARSIWA), “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State.”84 In an era increasingly thought to be transformative, from
See Montevideo Convention, note 8 above.
Pellet, “The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee, A Second Breath for the
Self-Determination of Peoples,” (1982) 3 European Journal of International Law, (1): 178-185.
81 Louis Charbonneau, “Palestinians win implicit U.N. recognition of sovereign state,”(2012)
http://www.reuters.com /assets/ print?aid =USBRE8AR0EG20121129, Thu, Nov 25 2017.
82 A distinction is important here. Israel allows the Palestine National Authority to execute
some functions in the Palestinian territories, depending on special area classification. Israel
however, maintains minimal interference (retaining control of borders: air, sea beyond internal
waters, land) in the Gaza strip and maximum in "Administrative Division of the Oslo Accords."
Palestine therefore does not meet the clear definition of state under Montevideo.
83 See "Final Act of Vienna," The Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815. Encyclopedia Britannica,
Accessed May 12, 2017. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/207113/Final-Act-ofVienna>.
84 See The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001; Also see James Crawford, The
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) pp. 110-113, 121-123; James R. Crawford. The International Law
79
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the rigid veil of statehood, the emphases on the principles of State responsibility and
sovereignty is important, even if both concepts are often thought to be conflicting. It is a
common observation that States in their sovereign capacity would not surrender their
rights or create conditions that would entice them to accept responsibilities that would
undermine those rights. States would even go as far as avoiding responsibilities in
situations where they initially agreed to accept one. Such a scenario is too common
because States reserve the power to assert for themselves the right to decide their own
interest in everything, and to recognize no other authority above them in their relations
when dealing with each other.85
Thus, questions of state responsibility assume that once statehood is acquired, the
emergent State incurs obligations for its action, inactions, or omissions arising from the
new international status. To meet this standard and be held to accountable under
international law, State action must constitute a breach of an international instrument or
must be one that is not in conformity with its international obligation or custom.86 Such
an obligation may entail the responsibility for the breach of an existing or newly
formulated obligation that impacts one state or the entire community of nations and for
which the new State is required to make reparation. The requirement for reparations –
that is, payments or other compensation offered as an indemnity for loss or damage87
speaks to the measures that a new State is obligated to take if and when a showing is made
establishing that the wrongful act committed constituted a breach of responsibility, and
consequently, a violation of its responsibility. Lastly, reparations viewed as a form of
sanction, can be also be applied to remedying the wrongful acts attributed to a State
regardless of whether those acts were committed by its agents or private parties under
the color of its orders. In the section below, I examine further events and cases that provide
clarity to the link that exist between statehood and state responsibility.
Statehood and State Responsibility
What are the consequences of the legal personality of a State? When a State
commits a wrongful act against another State or the international community, its breach
of international law triggers the duty that it makes reparation for the harmful
infringement of its obligation. Under such circumstances, the state is said to have
breached state responsibility. In this section, I provide and discuss four events and/or
cases that shed light on statehood and state responsibility.
Case-in-point A: In August 2008, the Italian government apologized for Italy’s
occupation of Libya from 1911-1943. Italy thus paid the equivalent of $5,000,000,000 to
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Crawford, James Crawford and S. Olleson.
"The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility," In International Law, ed. M. Evans.
(Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2003).
85 See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, (Princeton University Press,
1999).
86 See Article 12, ARSIWA, Note 21 above.
87 See "Reparations." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 2008. Encyclopedia.com.
(October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045302236.html; also see Carl P
Parrini and James I. Matray, "Reparations." Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. 2002.
Encyclopedia.com. (October 12, 2013). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G23402300133.html.
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compensate for this long term breach of Libya’s territory. Italy further provided Libya
with electronic monitoring devises on the Libyan coastline to help prevent clandestine
migration to Italy. Summarily, three elements combine to trigger State responsibility in
the expectation that there is (a) the existence of a legal obligation recognized by
international law, (b) an act or omission that violates that obligation, and (c) some loss or
articulable damage caused by the breach of that obligation. Whether actual damage is
required is the subject of intense debate.88 These elements are drawn from a variety of
sources, including various judicial and arbitration awards.
Case-in-point B: The previously Permanent Court International Justice in a 1928 case
The Factory at Chorzow89 is another example. In this case the PCIJ ruled that “it is a
principle of international law and even a greater conception of all law that any breach of
an engagement (responsibility to another State) involves an obligation to make
reparation.”90 This, according to the Court, reflects the fact that all legal systems require
those who cause harm through illegal or wrongful acts to take action to repair the harm
they have caused. In that case Germany had sued Poland seeking reparations for Poland’s
breach of its treaty obligation not to impound a German factory once built in Poland.
In addition, human rights treaties and declarations adopted by the United Nations
guarantee individual victims the right to a remedy, that is, access to justice and
reparations in national proceedings. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8,
proclaims that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or
laws."91 This guarantee would, of course, include remedies for criminal acts that violate
guaranteed rights. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains a
similar guarantee in its Article 2(3).92 The UN Human Rights Committee overseeing
compliance with the covenant has stated that when acts of torture occur, for example, a
government is under a duty to: “Conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of [the
victim's] torture, to punish those found guilty of torture and to take steps to ensure that
similar violations do not occur in the future.”93 That committee has also called for
investigation and prosecution in cases involving arbitrary executions and disappearances.
All these acts constitute types of reparations for the wrong done for which State
Responsibility are lodged. Support for these principles can be found in many arbitration
decisions.
Case-in-point C: In 1985, the crew of the Dutch-registered Greenpeace ship
Rainbow Warrior protested French nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The French
See Attila Tanzi, “Is Damage a Distinct Condition for the Existence of an International
Wrongful Act?,” M. Spinedi and B. Simma (ed) in United Nations Codification of State
Responsibility, (Oceana, Dobbs Ferry, 1987): 1-33.
89 The Factory at Chorzow (1927), (Germ. v. Pol.), (PCIJ Ser. A, No. 9, at 29) Permanent Court
International Justice,
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow.htm.
90 See note 26 above
91 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/pages/WorldRecord.aspx
92 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976., http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html
93 See UN Human Rights Council,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx
88
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military security service “Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure” then destroyed
the vessel in a New Zealand harbor, killing one of the crew members. New Zealand was
obviously upset because of this ostensible breach of its territorial sovereignty. France
consequently agreed to transfer the responsible French agents to its base in the Pacific
where they would remain for the last three years. The agents however, were subsequently
repatriated to France without New Zealand’s consent.
In a 1986 arbitration decision, the UN Secretary General ruled that “in such cases
where a state sends its agents abroad to commit acts which are illegal under international
or the domestic law of the target country, it is customary for the state to take
responsibility for the act and issue compensation …even where its agents are usually
granted immunity from local courts.”94 Essentially, France had incurred State
responsibility for its agents and related violation of its commitments to incarcerate its
agent in the geographical region, which was the scene of the crime. The Rainbow Warrior
Arbitration decision affirmed that “the legal consequences of breach of a treaty, including
the determination of circumstances that may exclude wrongfulness …the appropriate
remedies for breach, and subjects that belong to the customary law of state
responsibility.”95 Even though the actions of the French state were not a threat to
"international peace and security" per the UN Charter, they were widely held to be acts
of international delinquency comprising breach of sovereignty and espionage.
The Rainbow Warrior case is important at several levels. First, it bolsters the
notion that there is a doctrine of non-intervention in international law and that states will
be punished for contravening it. Second, it is also an interesting study of state
responsibility, individual responsibility, use of force and reparations. Third and lastly, it
supports the thesis that attribution is an important instrument in the goal of righting
justice under certain situations. France incurred State responsibility for its agents and
related violation of its treaty commitments because it presumably failed, per the treaty,
to incarcerate its agent in the geographical region which was the scene of the crime. The
logic of State responsibility here is that there had been an initial finding of fault or intent
on the part of a State’s agents from which State responsibility was imputed. The failure
of its agent to respect the terms the imprisonment was attributable to France as its
responsibility, for which it was held to pay reparations. It is not at all consequential nor
does matter if French State was itself at fault or its agents. The 1949 Corfu case below
clarify this problem.
Case-in-point D: The Corfu Channel Incident refers to three separate events
involving Royal Navy ships in the Channel of Corfu which took place in 1946.96 During
See New Zealand v France --- United Nations Reports of the International Arbitral Award
concerning the interpretation of two agreements, concluded on 9 July 1986 … arising from the
Rainbow Warrior Affair, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XX/215-284.pdf.
95 See Michael Pugh, "Legal Aspects of the Rainbow Warrior Affair," (1987). 36 The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, (3 July): 655–669; Rainbow Warrior (NEW
ZEALAND v. FRANCE) France-New Zealand Arbitration Tribunal. 30 April 1990; and Philip
Shabecoff, “France Must Pay Greenpeace $8 Million in Sinking of Ship,” Special to the New
York Times, October 03, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/03/world/france-must-paygreenpeace-8-million-in-sinking-of. Accessed March 28, 2017.
96 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania); Assessment of Compensation, 15 XII
49, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 15 December 1949, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid /402398c84.html [accessed 6 June 2017].
94
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the first incident, Royal Navy ships came under fire from Albanian fortifications. The
second incident involved Royal Navy ships striking mines, and the third incident occurred
when the Royal Navy conducted mine-clearing operations in the Corfu Channel, ventured
into Albanian territorial waters, and Albania complained to the United Nations. On the
question of whether a finding of fault or intent on the part of a State’s agents is required
for State responsibility when one alleges State harms, the International Court of Justice
in the 1949 Corfu Channel opinion suggests that some showing of fault is required for
liability (responsibility) to arise. Albania, the Court ruled, was responsible under
international law for the explosions and for damages and loss of life resulting from them
and that Albania owed a duty to Great Britain to pay compensation. In that case Great
Britain had sued Albania when British naval vehicle hit mines that had been laid in an
international strait off Albania’s coast. Albania denied any knowledge of the presence of
those mines in spite the rather suspicious circumstances. The Court reasoned that in
light of the facts of the case presented …. “it cannot be concluded …that the state
[Albania] necessarily knew or ought to have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated
therein, nor yet that it is necessarily knew, or should have known, the authors of the mine
lying in the strait.”97 Restated, Albania knew… and should have known since its Coast
Guards kept an eye [upon] and fired shots at potential violators and therefore fault is
attributable to the State of Albania via its agents ….. who presumably laid the mines.”
Finally, while judicial and academic writings are divided on the showing of fault,
most writings tend to agree that a standard of “strict liability” is required. In that view,
the State’s fault, intent, and apparent knowledge are not necessary conditions for State
responsibility. Under this standard, Albania would again have been liable for the damages to British
warships –even if it did not intend to harm another State, citizens, or property of Britain. Under a
strict liability standard however, a state can be held liable for failure to act, such as when floating

mines are placed in its territorial waters through which foreign vessels routinely navigate.
This may also include a State being held liable for an act of its agent or a non-state actor
within its jurisdiction under specified conditions.
Explaining Attribution, State Responsibility and VNSA in the Post 9/11 World
Can a State be held responsible for the wrongful acts of the violent non-State
actors within their jurisdiction, and if so, under what condition? This can only be possible
through a procedural fiction known as attribution. In the section below, I examine specific
conditions for attributing state responsibility in the post 9/11.
First, what is attribution? It is the direct theory under which responsibility is
ascribed. More generally Article 2 of the Act of State Responsibility sets out the required
elements for the existence of an internationally wrongful act.98 A necessary requirement
for holding any State responsible for wrongful conduct under this concept is a proven
relationship between the State and the actual perpetrator of the wrongful conduct. This
ranges from the most mundane cases to the most complicated. An important aspect of
this is that a State is not held responsible for the acts of private individuals. The State of
course, is an abstract entity that is unable to accomplish any physical act itself. Just as in
domestic law, corporations act through their officers and agents, so too under
See Corfu Channel Opinion Note 39 above.
See Article 2 …. The UN General Assembly, International Law Commission Draft Articles on
State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001.
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international law, the State acts mostly through its organs, the legislative and executive
officials. There is however, a substantive difference between legal consequences of (a)
attributing a non-State act to a State (for host of reasons that include direct sponsorship)
and (b) a failure of a State to meet due diligence obligations (e.g., a duty to prevent
terrorism …… or the unwillingness to hold accountable a non-state actors within the its
control). In the latter case, the host State will bear responsibility for the failure to exercise
due diligence rather than being held culpable, i.e., responsible for the act itself.
When then can the acts of Violent non-State Actors be attributed to a state?
First, the events of 9/11 make this question fundamentally an important one in
the assessment of attribution responsibility in the general discussion of State
responsibility. One has to be careful in assuming however, that in the post 9/11 world,
all else goes. For example, it is a faulty assumption that the sovereign of country A is
necessarily responsible and therefore liable just because bad guys, a terrorist, a
revolutionary, or a guerilla group opposed to country B has been given safe haven in
country A. As observed in this article, the theory of attribution is in practice a framework
under which the ascription of responsibility ideally flows under any assessment, the intent
of which is to impute State responsibility. However, in practice, the result of that
assessment may or may not necessarily lead to a conclusion worth making attribution to
country A.
Before a state can be held responsible for an act of a non-state actor, it is necessary
to prove a significant causal connection between the injuries caused by the act of the nonstate actor. This is further imputed to the State assumed to have breached its international
duty or obligations in the specific support provided to, for example, a terrorist
organization. Such specific support may very well include the provision of safe-harbor to
the violent non-State Actor. The Nicaragua v United States case in 1985 speaks to the reach
of state responsibility and therefore set conditions and requirements for making
attribution of a non-state act to a state.99 According to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) opinion in that case, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable
to a nation State, there must be a showing of an "effective control" of that armed group.
100

Ordinarily, the degree to which the act of a non-state actor is attributable to a
particular State would depend on some key factors. Famously amongst them is one where
the attribution is clearly established. For example, India’s radical Hindi group invades
Pakistan from India and kills women and children or a radical Islamist extremist invades
Israel from Jordan or Lebanon and does the same in Israel. Here the causal connection
between the injury (killing) and an act committed (invasion) by the Violent non-State
Actor in both scenarios are unquestionable. If proven, then the host States (India, Jordan
or Lebanon) which provided comfort or looked the other way would incur international
legal responsibility for the conduct of the Violent non-State Actors. This kind of
attribution is increasingly important today for several reasons. More than before because
Violent non-State Actors such as Al-Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia (FARC) in Ecuador, multinational corporations, and non-governmental
Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International
Legal Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986).
100 Nicaragua v United States of America Note 42 above.
99
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organizations play variable roles in the international system. Also more than before,
governments around the world are at increasing rates farming out to non-state actors
what use to be traditional State functions.
In some situations, demonstrating the cause and effect connection may not be all
that is standing on the way. The initial Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA) commenced
in 1950s made a seemingly easy question into a difficult one.101 For example, on the simple
question “…who bears international responsibility when an armed non-state actor or
group launches an attack in another country?” Is it the State from which the group
operates or the non-state actor? At first blush, ARSIWA Article 1 and 2 seem to provide
a clear answer. 102 However, on close examination both provisions deal more with
procedural than substantive rules in addressing which acts or omissions give rise to State
responsibility for breach of international law. After seventy years of tinkering, both
Articles 1 and 2 of the ARSIWA in 2001 were restated in what appeared to specific terms.
Article l of the 2001 version provides that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State
entails the international responsibility of that State.”103 Article 2 concurs, stating that
“[t]here is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action
or omission (a) is attributable to the State under international law;” and the action (b)
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”104 What is unclear in this
version, however, is the nature of the wrong - the type of wrong that constitutes State
action versus those that are not.
Beyond the unsettling aspects of Article 1 and 2, under the 2001 ARSIWA, there
are five instances from which clear and undisputable State attribution can be made.105 The
first clearest case of attribution is that of an organ of the State, notably, police officers,
and the army. Their actions are attributable to the State even in situations where they
flout orders or deploy orders that exceed authority under the national law.106 Article 7
makes no distinction whatsoever between the levels of involvement of the particular State
organ in the scheme of State organizational structure.107 So State responsibility can arise
from say the actions of a local policeman, just as it can from the actions of the highest
officials such as the head of state or Secretary of State.

See Resolution 799 (VIII) of 7 December 1953. By this resolution the General Assembly
requested the International law Commission to undertake “the codification of the principles of
international law governing State responsibility” as soon as it considered advisable. Indeed, at
the first session of the International Law Commission in 1949, the question of State
responsibility was included on a provisional list of fourteen topics which were considered
suitable for codification, but was not given priority (A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1-3). Also see 2001
version of Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December
2001.
102 See Article 2, Articles on State Responsibility, The UN General Assembly, International Law
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12 December
2001 (herein abbreviated as ARSIWA).
103 See United Nations Legislative Series, Materials on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ST/LEG/SER B/25, U.N. Sales. No. E.12.V.12).
104 See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
105 See Article 1 and 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
106 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
107 See Article 7, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
101
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Second, Article 5 provides that the rules of attribution cover situations in which
individuals, not otherwise State organs, are exercising "elements of governmental
authority.”108
Third, Article 8 provides that acts of private individuals are attributable to the
State if those individuals are acting on the instructions of the State, or under its effective
direction or control.109
Fourth, according to Article 9, in exceptional circumstances in which there is an
absence of governmental authority, the acts of private individuals may be attributable to
the State if those individuals perform necessary governmental functions. 110 Lastly, the State
may incur responsibility even though actions have been carried out by private individuals,
because the essence of the obligation is to ensure that a given result occurs. However,
events discussed below such as the Hezbollah in Lebanon, FARC in Ecuador, and the Al
Qaida in Afghanistan-Taliban, seem to put in doubt aspecst of the five stated instances
from which state attribution for responsibilities can be ascribed.
Attributing State Responsibility in Practice
Recent conflicts in Ecuador (with FARC, 2008) and in Lebanon and northern
Israel (2006), occurring between Nation States and violent non-state armed opposition
groups on the territory of States that had not themselves taken up arms, raise distinct
challenges for interpreting international law related to attribution of responsibility under
the most 2001 version of Act of State Responsibility (ARSIWA, 2001).
Case in point I: Ecuador-Columbia incident: On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked
members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) located within Ecuador,
killing the group's second highest-ranking member and 21 other militants.111 Colombia
justified its action under the right to use force in self-defense insisting that State
responsibility lay with Ecuador, which provided save haven to FARC to launch attacks
on Colombia. Colombia argued that Ecuador equally failed to meet due diligence
obligations in preventing the installation of terrorist cells within its territory. Ecuador
claimed that Columbia had violated its territorial sovereignty by engaging in hostile arm
attack with it territory without its consent.
The Organization of American States (AOS) ruled against Columbia, resolving in
favor of Ecuador that “the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever."112 Rejecting any
See Article 5, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
See Article 8, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
110 See Article 9, ARSIWA, see Note 45 above.
111 For an in-depth assessment of Colombia root's causes of armed struggle see …. Marco
Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-200, (Chapel Hill NC: Duke
University Press, 2006) and Rafael Pardo, “Colombia's Two-Front War.” (2000) 79 Foreign
Affairs, (4 July/August):64-73.
112 The principle of non-intervention and the right to territorial integrity are recognized by the
Charter of the OAS. According to Article 21, "The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not
be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by
another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or
special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."
108
109
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right of a State to use force in self-defense against terrorist groups located in another
State without that State's consent (since the OAS resolution does not mention the right
of self-defense) the ruling place the OAS in collision course with US policy and practice,
as well as with the UN Security Council's post 9/11 position on the matter.113 In a
nutshell, that policy considers terrorist violence as a trigger of the right to use force in
self-defense. Notwithstanding the outcome, the Colombia-Ecuador dispute is part of the
ongoing controversy in international law about the legality of the use of force by States
against Violent non-State actors that enjoy safe haven in the territory of other sovereign
States. Similar actions had been taken before by other States such as Israel, United States,
and Turkey as part of response to terrorist threat or the ongoing global war against
terror.
Case in point II: Lebanon-Israeli conflict: While the facts of Ecuador-Columbia
incident is one upon which a direct attribution and failure to meet due diligence
obligations could not stand, a particularly interesting point in the Lebanon-Israeli conflict
is whether the acts of Hezbollah can be attributed to Lebanon, Syria or Iran, given the
multitude attribution scheme it presents. Press accounts and Israel’s own view are clear
confirmation that Israel understands to whom attribution could be assessed in the IsraeliLebanese conflict. For example, Steven Erlanger of the International Herald Tribune
quotes the Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu as calling Hezbollah "an Iranian
Army division" fighting in a war "conceived, organized, trained and equipped by Iran."114
The Independent also reported that Israel claimed Lebanon was responsible for the initial
Hezbollah attack.115 Even if one were to assume that attribution of State responsibility
cannot adequately be made in light of all available information, it also raises interesting
questions since Hezbollah and its professed stands against Israel are widely known.116
Hezbollah’s obvious lack of transparency prompts the question of whether its acts
are attributable to the three countries - Lebanon, Syria and Iran, or any combination of
all three States in the attribution of State responsibility for the actions of Hezbollah.
Assuming that proper attribution is made to Lebanon as the host country (or Iran and
Syria) then the level of force used by Israel in Lebanon (that resulted in extensive human
As the main repository of international law, the UN plays an important role in strengthening
legal approaches to terrorism and in the respect adopted a number of resolutions condemning
acts of terrorism. For example, after 9/11 the UN Security Council called on states to take
action to curb terrorism and established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor
such a progress. Table 2 provides a listing of United Nations countering terrorism efforts from
9/11 through 2013.
114 See Steven Erlanger, “In Late Drive, Israel Seeks Outcome that looks like Victory," (2006)
International Herald Tribune, August 14, p.5, Accessed June 8, 2017.
115 See Robert Fisk, “In the face of Bush's Lies, it's left to Assad to tell the truth ….” The
Independent, August 16, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robertfisk-in-the-face-of-bushs-lies-its-left-to-assad-to-tell-the-truth-412046.html, 2006. Accessed
June 8, 2017.
116 An umbrella organization of radical Islamic Shiite organizations, Hezbollah is a Lebanese
group that opposes the West, and whose avowed purpose to create a Muslim fundamentalist
State modelled on Iran, and bitterly opposes Israel’s existence. Hezbollah is believed to be
responsible for hundreds of attacks since its 1982 inception, which have killed about 1000 people
(see Council of Foreign Relations <Http://www.cfr.org/Publications/9166>). Accessed June 8,
2017.
113
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casualties and property destruction) may raise further questions relative to how the
existing international laws of arm conflict applies to the conflict. This has to do with the
separate legal principles that govern (1) “the legality to resort to armed force” (jus ad
bellum) which generally turns on whether the U.N. Security Council has authorized the
use of force or whether the force is properly used as self-defense, and (2) the regulation of
“state conduct during of armed conflict” (jus in bello) which turn on whether in using the
authorized force proper measures were taken primarily to protect civil population or noncombatants and their property once an armed conflict has begun.
Sanctioned State Practices
An examination of recent state practices reveals a picture different from the
outcome of the Ecuador-Colombia conflict settled by the Organization of American States
(OAS) against Columbia. Recall that in that conflict, Colombia was held to have violated
Ecuador’s territorial sovereignty for failure to seek consent even though a non-state was
given safe-harbor in Ecuador, from which attacks were launched on Colombia. Recent
practices go beyond the scope of the international law for attributing State responsibility.
Under the circumstances presented below, the United States, Israel, and Turkey all used
and defended military strikes against non-state actors terrorist groups located inside
other sovereign nations.
As it turned out, the important difference in the Ecuador-Columbia conflict was
Colombia’s failure to seek Ecuadorian consent before entering its territorial space to
strike the FARC forces. The failure to seek consent according to OAS amounted to a
violation of the OAS treaty obligation and therefore constitutes a violation under
international law. Colombia was at fault, according to OAS, even if it had a legal right to
self-defense and Ecuador had in fact failed to take effective action to prevent the FARC
groups from operating within its territories. Thus, the question is not whether Ecuador
failed to take action against a terrorist group effectively enjoying safe-harbor within its
territory but whether Colombia’s took all legal means necessary to assert its self-defense
before invading Ecuador. Colombia could not argue, for instance, that Ecuador was
unwilling or unable to deter FARC faction within its territory.
Below are discussion of facts and circumstance that explain how the United States,
Israel, and Turkey in similar situation used and defended military strikes against nonstate actors or groups located within other sovereign nations.
Case in point I - United States pre-and post 9/11: The United States launched military
attacks against suspected terrorists in Sudan in 1998 as a response to the terrorist
bombings on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. At the wake of 9/11 and more
specifically in spring of 2002, the United States again attacked Afghanistan with the
intent to exterminate Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda.117 Afghanistan was a
source of threat, and its territory was either held hostage or being actively used by AlQaeda as safe-haven from which it launched attacks on United States and other countries.
As impressively documented by the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, Al-Qaeda was
the entity that launched the 9/11 commercial passenger jet attacks on US soil, killing
Thomas M. Frank, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 94-96; Frank M. Franck. Editorial Comment, “Terrorism
and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) American Journal of International Law 95(4) 839, 840.
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over 3000 civilians in New York, Washington DC, and Pennsylvania.118 Fallowing the
theory of attribution in law of State responsibility presented above, would Al-Qaeda acta
on 9/11 be attributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, or perhaps Saudi Arabia, the nationality of
most of the 9/11 terrorists? Although the 9/11 Commission Report, issued two years
later in 2004, confirmed most of what was already known right after the attacks, in 2002
the US and its coalition of the willing invaded Afghanistan. The US never declared war
against Afghanistan when it responded with deadly military force within its territory. 119
That was only part of the story since the choice to invade Afghanistan in particular had
been furnished earlier by the prior history of the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on United
States and its consular services in Africa.
Indeed, well before October 7, 2001 the United States had claimed self-defense as
it struck parts of Sudan in a 1998 retaliation against terrorist attacks on US embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania which took place on August 7, 1998. However, the US self-defense
claims were supported by a series of UN Security Council Resolutions issued after the
9/11 attacks and well before it.120 These resolutions condemned the terrorist attacks in
Kenya and Tanzania as well as establishing an Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanction committee.
It was this committee that charged the Taliban government of Afghanistan with serious
violations of international law for its role in providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda
terrorist group, training and planning facilities, and allowing the continued use of the
Afghan territory as safe-harbor for Al-Qaeda. These early resolutions passed in 1998 and
1999, even though unanticipated, were instrumental as they laid the legal framework for
the United States-led coalition for the armed incursion into Afghanistan territory in
response to 9/11th terrorist attacks.
Thus, as the world public opinion sympathetic to the United States after the 9/11
increased, new resolutions such as Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) further recognized
the United States’ inherent right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter.
Codenamed “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the invasion of Afghanistan had at least
three major goals: capture Osama Bin Laden, eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safe havens in
that country, and promote regime change in Afghanistan. Thus supported by Security
Council findings and resolutions condemning Al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, the post 9/11
resolutions doing the same, and a sympathetic world public opinion, the 2002 US attack
on Afghanistan was properly within the law of self-defense of the UN Charter.
Case in point II - Israel- Hezbollah conflict in Lebanon 2006: The State Department Bureau
for Counterterrorism 2013 report presents terrorist attack statistics on Israel that have
become very ordinary and routine. In other words, people have come to expect the worst
but from Israel’s perspective it is no laughing matter – the danger of its destruction is
immensely clear and present every day. It provides for example that some 224 mortar
The 9/11 Commission Report is the official report of the events leading up to the September 11,
2001 attacks commissioned by the President and Congress. The Commission concluded that 15
of the 19 hijackers who carried out the attacks were from Saudi Arabia but found no evidence
the government of Saudi Arabia conspired or funded the attackers. While the leader of the
attacks, Mohamed Atta, was from Egypt, two were from the United Arab Emirates, and one was
from Lebanon. All 19 hijackers however, were members of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization,
led by Osama bin Laden.
119 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).
120 See UN Security Council Resolutions Res #1189, (1998) and #1267, (1999).
118
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shells were launched toward Israel in 2013 compared to 2,331 rockets fired from Gaza at
Israel for the same period. That figure, of course, was up from a previous high of 2,000 in
2008. Table 2 provides a list of terrorist groups with an avowed agenda, the destruction
of Israel.
Table 2: Selected Violent Non-State Actors
Table 2
Names
& Base of Operations

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10

Description
(Who are they?)

Abu Nidal Organization
(ANO) a.k.a. Fatah;
Iraq

Transnational organization,
composed of functional
committees

Al‐Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade; West Bank,
Gaza Strip, Israel

Small cells of Fatah‐affiliated
activists

HAMAS (Islamic
Resistance
Movement); West
Bank, Gaza Strip, Israel
Hezbollah (Party of
God); Lebanon,
worldwide cells

Outgrowth of the Palestinian
branch of the Muslim
Brotherhood

Al‐Jihad (AJ); Cairo,
Egypt, Yemen,
Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Lebanon, UK
Kahane Chai (Kach);
Israel, West Bank

Egyptian Islamic extremists,
merged with al‐Qaeda in
2001

Palestine Islamic Jihad
(PIJ); Israel, West
Bank, Gaza Strip
Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF); Iraq

8

9

Selected Violent Non‐State Actors (Foreign Terrorist Organizations)
With Avowed Goals the Destruction of the State of Israel*

Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP); Syria, Lebanon,
Israel, West Bank,
Gaza Strip
TanzimQa'idat al‐Jihad
fi Bilad al‐Rafidayn
(QJBR) a.k.a. Al‐
Zarqawi Network and
Al‐Qaeda in Iraq; Iraq

A radical Shi'ite group with
aims for the creation of
Iranian‐style Islamic republic

Jewish extremist group aims
to restore the biblical state of
Israel
Militant Palestinians
committed to destroying
Israel through holy war
Broke away from PFLP‐GC
and split into pro‐PLO, –
Syrian, and –Libyan factions
Marxist‐Leninist group that
broke away from the Arab
Nationalist Movement

Established soon after start
of Operation Iraqi Freedom
to bring together jihadists
and other insurgents;
merged with al‐Qaeda

Goals
& Targets

Estimated
Strength

Year
Founded

A few
hundred

1974

Unknown

2000

Aims to replace Israel with
Palestinian Islamic state
using political and violent
means
Dedicated to eliminating
Israel, is anti‐U.S. and anti‐
Israel

Unknown

1987

A few
hundred

1982

Aims to replace the Egyptian
government with Islamic
state, attack U.S., Israeli
interests
Organizes protests against
the Israeli government

Several
hundred

1970s

Unknown

1994

Targets Israeli military and
civilians, opposes secularism

Unknown

1970s

Known for aerial attacks
against Israel

Unknown

1970s

Targets Israel's “illegal
occupation” of Palestine and
opposes negotiations with
Israel

Unknown

1967

Aims to expel Coalition
forces and establish Islamic
state in Iraq, then move to
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and
Jordan

Unknown

2003

Targets U.S., UK, France,
Israel, moderate
Palestinians, the PLO, Arab
countries
Aims to drive out Israelis
and to establish a
Palestinian state

Suspected
Activities
Attacks in 20 countries,
killing or injuring 900.
Leader Abu Nidal died in
2002
Shootings, suicide
operations (first
Palestinian female suicide
bombing)
Large‐scale suicide
bombings and attacks
against Israelis
Suicide bombings, hijacked
1985 TWA Flight 847;
rocket attacks against
Israel in 2006
Attacks on Egyptian
government personnel,
assassinated Anwar Sadat
Threats made to Arabs,
Palestinians, and Israeli
officials
Suicide bombings, attacks
on Israeli interests
Attacked Italian ship
Achille Lauro, murdered a
U.S. citizen
International terrorist acts
in the 1970s, attacks
against Israel and
moderate Arab targets
since 1978
Many bombings, killing
hundreds; assassination of
key Iraqi political figures;
beheadings of Americans

*Table includes the descriptions of each terrorist group, its goals and targets, estimated strength in numbers, year established, and its suspected
activities as designated by the US Department of State.
Source: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism ‐‐‐ From selected yearly reports on global terrorism 2010‐2014 Compile
and reconstructed by author (M. G. Pufong)
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In 2006, responding to a similar attack, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) launched
an armed attack on Hezbollah, a violent non-state terrorist group within the territory of
Lebanon, a State that did not take up arms against Israel’s interest. Specifically, Israel’s
action was in response to Hezbollah’s capture of two IDF soldiers and the killing of three
others. Israel’s response would escalate to what became the 34 day long Israel-Hezbollah
war.121 The question of whether Israel’s actions constituted a well-founded self-defense
within current State practices and within the spirit and letter of the UN Charter’s Article
51 is one of interest. Relative to Israel State practice, Amos Guiora reports that even
before the 2006 conflict, Israel maintained a policy that allowed for repeated targetkillings of Hezbollah, Hamas, PLO and Black September leaders in Gaza, South Lebanon,
and Syria.122 For a country such as Israel the post 9/11 apprehension or state of
apprehension is not new. Israel for one and more than any country, lives under the
constant threat of an attacked from known or unknown terrorist organizations.123
By most accounts, the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict (July 12, 2006) began when the
armed Islamic militant group Hezbollah crossed into Israel and attacked an IDF patrol,
killing three and capturing two others. While Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah
confirmed the capture of the two soldiers he said he was interested in setting up a prisoner
swap with Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert response was that Hezbollah's
attack constituted an "act of war" on Lebanon, to which he promised Israel’s strong
response. Israel’s response however, never included asking Lebanon to locate Hezbollah
nor did Israel seek Lebanon’s consent (as the first step of attributing State responsibility)
before a formal encroachment into Lebanese territory. The month-long war between
Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon caused heavy civilian deaths and property casualties in
Lebanon, Israel, and the Israeli occupied territories, with the lion’s share being in
Lebanon. It is possible that having concluded that Lebanon did not have the capacity to
suppress Hezbollah or Iran and Syria, Israel took matters into its own hands to launch
the attack into Lebanon. Under the theory of attribution of State responsibility, Israel

121.

One source attempt to offer a rational basis for diverse name for the war -- in Lebanon, the
war is known as the "July War," while many Israelis call it the "Second Lebanon War" (see
http://www.historyguy.com/israel-lebanon_war_2006.html) accessed January 20, 2017.
122 For example, on February 1992, Israel killed Sheikh Abas Musawi, head of Hezbollah, in a
targeted strike against his convoy in South Lebanon. On February 2008, Israel was the
mastermind behind the targeted killing of another Hezbollah leader, Imad Mugniyah, the
second in command of the organization, in the heart of Damascus, Syria. The real argument is
that targeted killing is a legitimate form of active self-defense in the context of anticipatory selfdefense. As Amos Guiora observe if the decision to target a particular individual is based on
reliable and corroborated intelligence information and on the premise that no alternatives exist
including arrest, and the individual being targeted is perhaps a leader whose death will impact
upon the terrorist organization then the targeted killing is legal. See Amos Guiora “Targeted
Killings as Active Self-defense.” (2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of International Law,
(xx): 319-330 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584. Also elsewhere Hunter
define targeted as the premeditated, preemptive, and deliberate killing of an individual or
individuals known to represent a clear and present threat to the safety and security of a state
through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. See Thomas B. Hunter, Targeted Killing:
Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism, (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing 2009).
123 Table 3 listing terrorist organization with mission the express intent the elimination of the
state of Israel paints the clearest picture of the level of concern Israel must have about her
security and why she must take offensive measure for its protection.
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could legitimately have gone after Iran and Syria, the known sources of Hezbollah and
related terrorist support in Lebanon.
In the end, reactions by other States and actors as the 2006 incident unfolded were
generally that Israel was entitled in principle to act in self-defense, but that Israel’s
actions were disproportionate in the sense that it did not exclusively target Hezbollah.
But neither the Israeli official position on its use of force, nor the international
community’s reactions to it, were clear enough to be conclusively meaningful. For
example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) which ended hostilities124
called for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, [the initial
resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006)]. These resolutions required the disarmament
of all armed groups in Lebanon, the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon (so that, pursuant
to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006) there would be no weapons or authority
in Lebanon other than the Lebanese government.125 If anything, the 2006 war and the
UN Resolution that followed confirmed once again that the Lebanese government was
impotent and could not either defend or keep others away from fighting proxy wars
within its territorial space.
Indeed, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had done the same in the
1970s as they moved in and took over southern Lebanon to fight against Israel. The UN
Resolution 1701 calling for a full implementation of the Taif Accords of 2004 suggests that
had Israel sought UN permission before intervening into Lebanon in 2006 it would have
met some difficulties. At the very least, it is very likely that Israel could have been asked
to see through the implementation of the outstanding peace accords. For Israel, the
alternative route –i.e., the war of July 2006 – did not accomplish much. In light of the
human and capital damages inflicted on Lebanon, it is likely that Israel’s claim of selfdefense as the trigger for intervention could not have stood scrutiny under the standard
of necessity and proportionality under the prevailing customary international law.
The case between Uganda and the Republic of Congo (2006) is also instructive
here.126 In its assessment of Uganda's claim that its use of armed force within Congo was
in self-defense, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that "the taking of airports
and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda's border would not seem
proportionate to the series of trans-border attacks it claimed had given rise to asserted the
right of self-defense ....”127 Indeed, most people remained unpersuaded that the customary
right of self-defense is the strongest in light of its consequences.
Case in point III - Turkey-Iraqi conflict in Northern Iraq: In 2008, Turkey launched a
major military incursion into Iraq to attack Kurdish militants of the Kurdistan Worker
Party (PKK) and killing at least 150 PKK fighters, which Turkey considered a terrorist
group. The ground offensive was preceded by Turkish Air Force aerial bombardments
against PKK camps in northern Iraq, which began on December 16, 2007. This
constituted the "first confirmed ground incursion" of Iraqi territory since the 2003 U.S.
124 See

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, Adopted by the UN Security Council
at its 5511th meeting, on August 11, 2006
125 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1680 (2006) [on implementation of
Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) on political independence of Lebanon], 17 May 2006,
S/RES/1680 (2006), available at: http://www.refworld.org /docid/453786a80.html [accessed
October 16, 2017].
126 See Congo v. Uganda - Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo in Democratic
Republic of the Congo 2005 ICJ ___, 45 I.L.M. 271 (2006).
127 Congo v. Uganda – Note 63 above.
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led invasion. Turkey’s successful incursion into Iraqi’s territory, which was intended to
destroy PKK bases, was accomplished with the help of well over 10, 000 troops who took
part in the operation.128 Turkey's main argument was that Iraq had not been able to
exercise its authority over the northern part of its country since 1991.129
The Turkish government argued that a request was made to the Government of
Iraq to fulfill its obligations under international law to prevent the use of its territory for
the staging of terrorist acts against Turkey. Thus, while Turkey’s position could well
have been that because of the failure to act in the part of Iraq, Turkey was then absolved
of any responsibility for violating Iraqi sovereignty, it contended instead that it had acted
within the legitimate measures to protect its own security in the face of Iraq's inability to
exercise authority over the northern part of its country. Thus, the failure to prevent the
use of its territory as staging ground to launch terrorist acts against Turkey compelled
Turkey to take the necessary and proportionate actions.130 In a letter dated 24 July 1995
to the UN Security Council refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi
sovereignty, Turkey claimed to have resorted to a legitimate measures to protect its own
security in the face of Iraq's inability "to exercise authority over the Northern part of its
country" to prevent "the use of its territory for the staging of terrorist acts against
Turkey.131
It is important to note that one can only assume the rightness of Turkey’s
intervention in northern Iraq if one believes that (a) it sought permission and that Iraqi’s
failure to respond or prevent the use of its territory justified such a military intervention;
and (2) if one agrees also that the means used by Turkey to attack Kurdish militants of
PKK and killing 150 of their fighters was proportionate to the harm inflicted by the PPK
on Turkey. The logic is self-defeating.
Precedents on Responsibility
By all accounts, the traditional approach to State responsibility for acts of nonState actors was articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua v.
United States and later in the Iran Hostages judgments rendered by the Court in the 1980s.
That precedent would later be reaffirmed, be it in a modified form, by the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the
Tadic case in 1999. The Court thus has spoken only on few cases leaving the rest to state
practices which also serve as additional source of law.
Case in point 1 – Nicaragua v United States and Tadic Cases: In the Nicaragua case,
to establish State responsibility the Court required an effective State control of the non-

See The Economist. The Kurds: Turkey invades northern Iraq. The Economist. Print
Edition. Feb 28, 2008 to March 1, 2008, at. 42. http://www.economist.com/node/10766808,
Accessed June 8, 2017
129 The Economist March 1, 2008, Note 65 above.
130 See UN Security Council Doc S/1995/605, 1995.
131 United Nation Security Council Documents, UN Doc S/1995/605 (1995), “Letter of 24 July
1995 refuting Libya's allegations of Turkey's violations of Iraqi sovereignty ….”
http://habitat.igc.org/sc/600-699.html.
128
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State actor.132 Thus for example, financing, organizing, training and equipping a group is
not enough to trigger State responsibility per the standard adopted by the Court. In the
end, the US was found to be internationally responsible to Nicaragua but not under the
“effective control” standard of attributing responsibility to a State. In this case the US
was accused by Nicaragua for supporting the opposition group, the Contras. According
to the ICJ, in order for an act of a non-state armed group to be attributable to state, there
must be an "effective control" wherein even 'financing, organizing, training, supplying
and equipping" as well as "the selection of its military or paramilitary targets and the
planning of the whole of its operation" is not enough to meet the exacting threshold. 133
However, the 1999 Tadic ruling relaxed the "effective control" standard of
attribution specifically for acts by non-state military organizations, but still required the
State’s “overall control” going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces to
also include participation in the planning and supervision of military operations.”134
Case in point 2 – The Iran Hostage Case: Beyond the Nicaragua and Tadic rulings
noted above, another way in which acts of non-state actors can be attributed to a State is
if the State acknowledges and adopts such actions after they have occurred. That is, a
State may incur responsibility, even if those individuals acted on their own initiative. This
is precisely how the ICJ reasoned in Iran Hostage Case where foreign embassies were
overrun by mobs and diplomatic staff were taken as hostages by private individuals.135 In
that case, the Court opined that State Responsibility was extended to the Iranian
government not only because it conceded the facts, but because “the government
subsequently adopted the student-driven attacks on the US and Canadian diplomatic
offices and hostage taking.”136 According to the Court, the Iranian government was
responsible even if its position and those taken by the student had no affiliation at the
time the hostage situation occurred.137 Thus, a State may incur responsibility even though
actions have been carried out by private individuals, because the essence of the obligation
is to ensure that a given result occurs.
It is obvious from the Nicaragua, Iran, and Tadic cases discussed here that along
the way it became evident that the Nicaragua standard for State responsibility became
extremely difficult to sustain. Attributing State responsibility and therefore culpability
became difficult to apply even where a State was in fact in the wrong. The International
Law Commission’s 2001 report codifying customary law titled “Articles on State
See Nicaragua v. United States of America - Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 International Court of Justice 14, 25 International Legal
Materials 1023 (1986) (Judgment of 27 June 1986)
133 See Nicaragua v. United States of America – Note 61 above.
134 See The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. 14 July 1997. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-sj970714e.pdf. Also
see "Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić - Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2 October 1995.
http://www.iilj .org/courses/documents/Prosecutorv.Tadic.pdf.
135 United States v Iran - Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States of America v. Iran); Order, 12 V 81, International Court of Justice
(ICJ), 12 May 1981, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4023aaf77.html
[accessed 5 June 2012].
136 See United States v Iran, Note 78.
137 See United States v Iran, Note 78.
132
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Responsibility” sought to clarify this point of law in Articles 8 and 11.138 First it
recognizes the effective control standard for State responsibility announced by ICJ in the
Nicaragua Case in 1985. Articles 8 therefore asserts the prevailing view of State
Responsibility relative to acts of Non-State actors by stating that “The conduct of a person
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or
group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that
State in carrying out the conduct”.139 Prior to the adoption of the Articles on State
Responsibility the conduct of the private individuals were not attributable to the State,
and Article 8 of the 2001 version of the Articles on State Responsibility prospectively
remedied that deficiency. With this adjustment made acts of private individuals occurring
at a point where there is an existing relationship between an individual and the State is
as 2001 applicable to host the State.140
Second, also complementing Article 8 and providing much needed
clarity, Article 11 provides that “Conduct which is not attributable to a State
under the preceding articles (1 through 10) shall nevertheless be considered an
act of that State under international law if … the State acknowledges and adopts
the conduct in question as its own.”141 Thus, once the threshold of responsibility
is met, the act of the non-state actor is considered an act of the State with all
ensuing legal consequences.
State Responsibility and Sovereignty
There are obvious tension between the prohibitions against the use of force
(UN Charter 2 (4)) intended to safeguard the political independence and
territorial integrity of a UN member State and the right to self-defense to protect
the territorial sovereignty of a member State (UN Charter, Article 51). The use
of predatory drones to hunt and to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, the
invasion and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and the invasion and capture
of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who planed Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US
Embassies in East Africa are examples of self–defense par excellence that may
be complicated by the initial territorial independence or sovereignty violation
claims.
Case in point – I: The use of Drones: Ongoing studies by the New America
Foundation show that between 2004 and 2013 they were 365 reported US drone
strikes in the northwest Pakistan with 132 of these occurring between January
See Articles on State Responsibility 2001, Note 21 and 39 above. Also see James Crawford
(2002) [pp. 110-113, 121-123], The International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility, Note 21.
139 See Note 21 above, James Crawford (2002) [pp. 110-113, 121-123], commentary on The
International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility.
140 However, the new Articles 8 commentary cautioned that most common cases of the kind
would arise mostly where a State organ supplements their own actions by instigating or
recruiting a third party (private persons) to act either as an auxiliary while remaining outside
the official structure of the State.
141 See Articles on State Responsibility, ARSIWA Note 39 above. … Resolution A/RES/56/83
of 12 December 2001
138
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and September 30, 2013 alone. According to the New America Foundation, the
365 drone strikes occasioned approximately 2065 to 3064 individual deaths, of
whom 1611 to 2787 were described as militants. Non-militant fatality rates since
2004 through 2013 were approximately 12%, a decrease of 6% from 2012
percentages.142 The sheer number of US drone strikes alone begs the question
whether, in the continued war on terror, the US encroached on the sovereignty
of some other state (Pakistan) in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter? If
not, at the very least, it raises the question whether under the new post 2001
Article of State Responsibility, United States must obtain consent of the target
State (Pakistan) before targeting Violent non-State Actors (VNSA) who engage
in armed attacks against US military personnel within that country.
Professor Kenneth Anderson takes the position that the right to use
targeted predatory drones as weaponry in the war on terror to protect U.S.
troops from continued Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks is a valid asserted right
of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.143 However, seen in
isolation of any factual determination of US claim for self-defense, the notion
that the US violated the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan is an incomplete
assertion. What is necessary is an individualized and factual determination of
any purported claim of self-defense. For example, UN Article 51 not only
grants the right to self-defense but also requires proportionality in its
execution. In the last few years there has been an emerging consensus among
scholars that an armed attack by a violent non-State actor (VNSA) on a State,
its embassies, its military post, or on its nationals abroad would trigger the
right to self-defense, even if such an attack is directed to a safe-harbor in a
foreign country.144 More recently (2010), Jordan Paust also confirmed that the
See The New America Foundation, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone
Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013“ www.Newamerica.net.
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis?page=1 Accessed September 14 2013.
143 See Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May
11, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415070 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1415070.
144 See Kimberly N. Trapp “Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of SelfDefense Against Non-State Actors,”(2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly,(01):
141-156, doi:10.1093/iclq/lei153; Louis Henkin, “War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor,”
(2005) 45 Santa Clara Law Review, pp. 817, 821; Emanuel Gross, “Thwarting Terrorist Acts by
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights
Versus the State’s Duty to Protect Its Citizens,” (2004) 15 Temple International Law &
Comparative Journal, (36):195-217; Amos Guiora, “Targeted Killings as Active Self-defense.”
(2004) 36 Case Western and Reserve Journal of International Law, (xx):319-330 Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=759584; Derek, Remarks, “Self-Defense in an Age of
Terrorism,” (2003) 97 American Society of International Law Proceeding,pp. 144- 146; Norman
G. Printer, Jr. ,“The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors Under International Law: An
Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen,” (2003) 8 University of California Los Angeles
Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 8(Fall/Winter): 331-353; Jordan J. Paust,
“Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad,” (1986) 8 Whittier
Law Review (xx)pp. 711-729; Jordan J. Paust, “Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond,” (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal, (xx) pp. 533-35;
Jordan J. Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan” (2002) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2):pp. 237-279, available
142
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use of targeted predatory drones is permissible if done in response to an armed
attack by VNSA to protect US and NATO troops, and not to engage a foreign
state or occupy its territory.145 Also, human rights treaties such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(ICCPR Article 6(1)]
and the European Convention on Human Rights [(ECHR Article 2(1)]
recognize “the inherent right to life” and “prohibit arbitrary deprivations of
life”146 as well as “allow[ing] for the intentional taking of life when absolutely
necessary.”147
Both the ICCPR and ECHR instruments require a State to show, for
example, that an invasion and/or killing is necessary and that other non-lethal
options were explored but were not viable. Thus for example, drone targeting
of Al-Qaeda and Taliban membership does not constitute a violation of human
rights treaties if actual arrests were difficult or even impossible to execute.
Case in point – II: The Killing of Osama Bin Laden: The US invasion of Pakistan
and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 raises several
important legal and political issues under the international law of responsibility
and territorial independence. At the wake of the successful U.S. military
operation, the Pakistan Government objected to the “unauthorized unilateral
action” by the United States and cautioned that the event “shall not serve as a
future precedent for any state.”148 Former President Musharraf also followed
suite complaining that the operation violated Pakistan’s sovereignty.149 The UN
Charter Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the political independence
and territorial integrity of a UN Member State. But Article 51 speaks to the
exception and therefore to the right to self-defense. Both Charter provisions
address what in practice are matters of law and state practices. Beyond the
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717, Accessed March 28, 2012; Oscar Schachter, “The
Extra-Territorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases,” (1989) 11 Houston Journal of
International Law,(02): pp. 309, 311-12; Thomas M, Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action
Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Thomas M, Franck,
Editorial Comment, “Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) 95 American Journal of
International Law (4)pp. 839, 840 ; Jules Lobel. (1999). “The Use of Force to Respond to
Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan,” (1999) 24 Yale Journal of
International Law (Summer): pp. 537-547; Sean D. Murphy, “Terrorism and the Concept of
Armed Attack in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,” (2002) 43 Harvard Journal of International Law
(1): pp. 41-52.
145 See Jordan Paust, “Self-Defense Targeting of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S.
Use of Drones in Pakistan” (2009) 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, (2) (December 8):
237, 2010; available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520717.
146 See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) [adopted and opened
for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI)]
December 16, 1966, entry into force March 23, 1976.
147 See Council of Europe, The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ROME 4
November 1950, F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, http://conventions.coe.int. Accessed June 8, 2012.
148 Jane Perlez & David Rohd, “Pakistan Pushes Back against U.S. Criticism on Bin Laden,” N.Y.
Times, May 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/world/asia/04pakistan.html.
149 John Bacon, “Musharraf: U.S. Violated Pakistan’s Sovereignty, “USA Today, May 3, 2011,
http://content. usatoday.com /communities/ondeadline/post/2011/05/musharraf-usviolatedpakistan-sovereignity/1, Accessed June 8, 2017.
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trappings of the law and claim of sovereignty, state practices support the
“unwilling or unable” standard of self-defense as a contemplative limit before
invasion is executed.150
As the Columbia-Ecuador conflict in 2008 discussed earlier exemplifies,
non-State actors including terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda regularly launch
attacks against States from bases within the State they enjoy safe-harbor. Such
practices not only violate international law but they are risky undertakings
which more often than not would instigate retaliatory measures. However,
victim-States (such as the United States) are well advised not to undertake any
action without the consent of the source State. Specifically, any incursion of
military forces into the territory of the source State would objectively violate its
territorial sovereignty and formally the UN Charter Article 2(4), which prohibits
the use of force against the political independence and territorial integrity of UN
Member States. The normal calculus for a victim State, who seeks to respond
with force, is to consider whether to proceed with force on the territory of a State
with whom it has no conflict. Absent consent from the host State of the source
of attack or an authorization from the UN Security Council, international law
requires that a victim-State assess whether the host State is “unwilling or unable”
to suppress the threat within its territory. Effectively, a balance between
sovereignty and self-defense is necessary in that assessment.
Writing in 1958, Ian Brownlie observed that military actions across
national frontiers to suppress armed groups, which has been determine to be a
“source of an attack” and which the host state was unable or unwilling to suppress,
could be seen as a legitimate form of self-defense.151 In an August 2007 speech,
then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama reasserted the Brownlie conception
as he stated that, if elected, his Administration would take action against the
leadership of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan if the United States had actionable
intelligence about al Qaeda targets and President Musharraf had failed to act.152
Obama would later clarify his position, stating that what he said instead was that
“if we have actionable intelligence against Bin Laden or other key al Qaida
officials . . . and Pakistan is unwilling or unable to strike against them, we
should.”153

150 Also

see David A Wallace, “Operation Neptune's Spear: The Lawful Killing of Osama Bin
Laden.” (2012) 45 Israel Law Review, (2): 367-377. doi:10.1017/S0021223712000118.
151 See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, (1958) 7
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 712, 732 for the thread of the argument that the
United States was well within its rights under international law to launch an attack into
Pakistan against bin Laden.
152 Dan Balz, “Obama Says He Would Take Fight to Pakistan,” Washington Post, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com /id/23392577/ns/politics-decision_08/ Accessed June
8, 2012.
153 Presidential Candidates Debate Pakistan, Feb. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23392 577/ns/ politics-decision_08/ Accessed March 28,
2017.
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More recently, both Noam Lubell154 and Harold H. Koh155 have also
recited the unwilling or unable test as the correct yard stick to determine when a
victim State may take retaliatory measures against non-State actors within the
territory of another State. The assessment is fact-based and intensive. In
practice, States such as Israel, Russia, and Turkey are among those who have
taken liberty of the unwilling or unable doctrine to exercise their self-defense right,
thus establishing chronological records of contemporary state practices.156 The
United States invasion and killing of Osama Bin Laden viewed in light of the
US’s own views and related precedents on the matter also fit well with the
unwilling or unable test. Here is why: both the Bush and Obama administrations
took the view that the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda. To
both governments Al-Qaeda undertook an armed attack against the United
States on September 11, 2001, which triggered the U.S. right of self-defense.
Therefore given the nature of the enemy and the mayhem caused and
likelihood yet of another hit, the ensuing conflict extends beyond any particular
battlefield, be it in Afghanistan, Yemen or Bahrain to wherever members of AlQaeda can be found, as the case Al-Aulaqi v. Obama 2010 makes abundantly
clear.157 For those who adopt this position, once a state is in an armed conflict
with a non-state armed group, that conflict follows the members of that group
wherever they go, as long as the group’s members continue to engage in
hostilities against that Victim State. The contrarian view is that armed conflicts
have geographic limits as a matter of international law. That is, such a fact must
be determined to establish the existence of an armed conflict before all things
else.
In light of the United States’ position in the war on terror, the US as the
victim State had the option of seeking the consent of the source-of-attack State
(Pakistan) before intervening in Pakistan to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden or
go at it alone without notifying Pakistan. It elected the later. The United States
went after Bin Laden alone, but why? A New York Times piece of May 4, 2011
suggest that “Pakistani officials were angry about C.I.A. Director Panetta’s postfact assertion that Washington did not share advance knowledge of the raid with
Pakistan because it might have leaked, allowing Bin Laden to escape.”158 Also a
Wall Street Journal piece of May 5, 2011, confirmed that “U.S. and European
154 See Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
155 See Keynote Address “The Obama Administration and International Law,” to the American
Society of International Law in a Time of Change (Harold H. Koh Mar. 25, 2010)
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, Accessed March 28, 2012.
156 See John Bellinger, “Legal Issues in the War on Terrorism,” London Sch. Economics.,
October 31, 2006, at www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061031_JohnBellinger.pdf, 2006,
Accessed June 8, 2017.
157 In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama a ruling favoring the Obama administration, the Court observed that
“…the fact that the United States’ armed conflict with al-Qaeda exists in one particular location
does not mean that it cannot exist outside this geographic area” (See, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C.2010) (No. 10 Civ. 1469). Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at p.1.).
158 Allen Cowell,”Pakistan Sees Shared Intelligence Lapse,” N.Y. Times, May 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes. com/2011/05/05/world/asia/05react.html, Accessed June 8, 2017.
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intelligence officials increasingly believed active or retired Pakistani military or
intelligence officials provided some measure of aid to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden, allowing him to stay hidden just a mile from an elite military academy.”159
Beyond the obvious lack of trust that one senses, both the New York Times and
Wall Street Journal sources suggest why the United could neither sought consent
or shared information with Pakistan before the invasion to its territory that
resulted in the killing of Osama Bin Laden.
What exactly constitute unwilling and unable? From the victim-State
perspective, it simply means whether the host State has demonstrated a clear and
convincing willingness and is logistically capable or able to suppress the sourcesof-threat from its territory. For example, in the Pakistan-US relationship during
the war on terror, many facts should stand out when evaluating Pakistan’s
willingness or ability of Pakistan to suppress the threat posed by Bin Laden and
Al Qaeda on either the United States, NATO and Afghan forces, or to the
security of other States that suffered the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks. More
specifically, the victim state must (1) ask the host State to address the threat and
provide adequate time for the host State to respond; (2) reasonably assess the
host State’s control and capacity of the threat; (3) reasonably assess the host
State’s proposed means to suppress the threat; and (4) evaluate prior interactions
between the victim State and the host State. It must be understood that for host
of reasons state practice does not mandate that a victim State such as the US
seeks the support of the host State (Pakistan) before an invasion is executed.
Exempted situations include those where a victim State has strong reasons to
believe that the host State is colluding with the non-state source-of-threat, or
where asking the host state to take steps to suppress the threat might lead the
host to tipping off the non-state actor before the victim-State can undertake its
mission against the non-state actor.160
Thus, the test just stated is an action-based test that requires a careful
examination of Pakistan’s conduct in the US initiated war on terror and US
expectation of Pakistani role in that war. This also requires an assessment of
the United States’ perception of Pakistani support relative to the mission of
finding Bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda operatives. Thus, the purpose of Operation
Enduring Freedom in “President Bush’s National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism” released February 14, 2003 is worth reiterating as well as its major
goals: (1) to capture of Osama Bin Laden, (2) to eradicate Al-Qaeda terrorist safehavens, and (3) to promote regime change in Afghanistan.161 Pakistan’s
assistance relative to the stated goals is decisive in any assessment of what
influenced the United States to go alone after Bin Laden, a decision that might
stand scrutiny to the conclusion that Pakistan was either “unwilling or unable”
to fully assist the United States in its mission on war on terror. To both the
United States and Pakistan there was an undeniable lack of trust which wore
159 See Adams Entous, Julian Barnes & Matthew Rosenberg, “Signs Point to Pakistan Link,”
Wall St. J., May 5, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704322804576303553679080310.html,
Accessed June 8, 2017.
160 See John Bellinger, Note 99 above.
161 See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, February 14, 2003, http://georgewbush
whitehouse.archives.gov /news /releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html.
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down considerably, especially during the declared decade of the war on terror.162
The bases of such mistrust it has been asserted were often very different and
conflicting in expectations and national interests.163
Well before the US intervention and killing of Osama Bin Laden,
Pakistan had long harbored doubts over whether the United States respected its
sovereignty. Pakistan pointed to the fact that US aircraft in transit to
Afghanistan, flew outside the established air corridor from the Arabian Sea in
violation Pakistani territorial sovereignty.164 The Pakistani military and its
Intelligence Service had always been suspicious of the real motives of the United
States and how a long term relationship with the US would benefit their own
interest. 165 On the other hand, there is also the observation that the United
States primary concern has always been whether the Pakistani establishment and
elements within it, receiving US financial aid, publically proclaimed allegiance
to US causes while in private acting against US global interests in the war on
terror.166 Overcoming these suspicions required creating trust in an effort to
sustain the critical effort of achieving the objectives of the global war on
terrorism.
In light of these doubts, the killing of Osama Bin Laden on May 4, of
2010 signaled to Pakistan that the United States could act alone to defend its
self-defense interest, especially where it deemed that Pakistan was either
unwilling or incapable of outsourcing an avowed enemy of the United States.
The practical effect of US behavior should be seen less as the willingness to act
with impunity on the territory of a foreign state and more as the share
brazenness to root out terrorists out who were eager to cause another 9/11 on
United States before they could do so. The fact that Osama Bin Laden could
hide in plain sight of Pakistan's intelligent Services (ISI) reinforced US suspicion
that privately Pakistan was unwilling to assist the US in the war on terror. The
other possibility—that Bin Laden perhaps was sheltered by the Pakistan's
Intelligence is even more terrifying. Yet, it also supports the trustless thesis, that
Pakistan was not a reliable partner in the war on terror. This is a stronger
conclusion as US officials in the past had consistently maintained that Al-Qaeda’s
top leaderships were hiding in Pakistan.
Lastly, the invasion and capture of Abu Anas al-Libi in Libya who
planed Al-Qaeda’s 1998 bombing of two US Embassies in east Africa, similar to
the invasion of Pakistan, from the US perspective, signaled as the New York
Times put it “a limit to its patience.”167 Thus, two years after NATO intervention

Randall L. Koehlmoos, “Positive Perceptions to Sustain the US-Pakistan Relationship” (2010)
40 Parameters, (2, Summer):46-57.
163 See Koehlmoos Note 105 above.
164 See Koehlmoos Note 99 above.
165 See Karen DeYoung “U.S., Pakistan Tread Delicately Toward More Cooperation,” The
Washington Post, 29 April 2010, A8.
166 See Reza M. Pirbhai. The Trust Deficit: US / Pakistani Relations, Then and Now, The
Global Realm http://www.counterpunch.org/pirbhai05272011.html, June 3, 2011.
167 See Carlotta Gall and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Libya Condemns U.S. for Seizing Terror
Suspect,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/, October 6, 2013; also see Peter Baker and
David E. Sanger, “Raids Show the Limits of U.S. Military Strikes”
162
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that removed Qaddafi from power and waiting for the new Libyan government
to go after suspected terrorists’ cells in Libya, the US signaled with this invasion
and capture, its willingness to go alone.

Table 3: List of Security Council Measures Adopted on Aspects of United Nations Focus on
Terrorism, 1999-2014
Table 3
Resolution

List of Security Council Measures Adopted on Aspects of United Nations Focus on Terrorism ‐1999‐2014
Date Passed
Content and Purpose

S/RES/2133 (2014)
S/PV.7101
S/RES/2129 (2013)
S/PV.7086
S/RES/2083 & 2082
(2012) S/PV.6890
S/RES/1963 (2010)
S/PV.6459
S/RES/1904 (2009)

Jan. 27, 2014

[Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]

Dec. 17, 2013

[Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]

17 Dec. 2012

[Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]

20 Dec. 2010

S/RES/1822 (2008)

30 June 2008

S/RES/1810 (2008)
S/RES/1805 (2008)

25 April 2008
20 Mar. 2008

[on extension of the mandate of Counter‐Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) as special political
mission under the policy guidance of Counter‐Terrorism Committee (CTC)]
[on authorizing the establishment of an Office of an Ombudsperson for an initial period of 18 months to assist the
1267 Committee in its consideration of delisting requests; directing the 1267 Committee to grant humanitarian
exemptions expeditiously and transparently; and streamlining the listing process of names of individuals and entities
onto the Consolidated List.]
[on directing 1267 Committee to conduct a review of all names on the Consolidated List by 30 June 2010 and
followed by regular reviews; making accessible publicly releasable reasons for the listing of individuals and entities
and extending the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for a further period of 18
months]
[on extending mandate of the 1540 Committee for a further three years until 25 April 2011]
[on extending mandate of Counter‐Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) until 31 December 2010]

S/RES/1787 (2007)
S/RES/1735 (2006)

10 Dec. 2007
22 Dec. 2006

S/RES/1732 (2006)

21 Dec. 2006

S/RES/1730 (2006)

19 Dec. 2006

S/RES/1699 (2006)

8 Aug. 2006

S/RES/1673 (2006)
S/RES/1631 (2005)

27 April 2006
17 Oct. 2005

S/RES/1625 (2005)
S/RES/1624 (2005)
S/RES/1618 (2005)
S/RES/1617 (2005)

14 Sept.2005
14 Sept 2005
4 Aug. 2005
29 July 2005

S/RES/1611 (2005)
S/RES/1566 (2004)

7 July 2005
8 Oct 2004

S/RES/1540 (2004)

28 April 2004

S/RES/1535(2004)
S/RES/1530(2004)
S/RES/1526(2004)

26 Mar.2004
11 Mar. 2004
30 July 2004

S/RES/1516(2003)
S/RES/1465(2003)

20 Nov 2003
13 Feb 2003

17 Dec. 2009

[on extension of Counter‐Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) mandate]
[on reviewing the measures imposed resolution 1267 (1999) with a view to their further strengthening in 18 months;
providing cover sheet for listing submissions, extending consideration period for exemption requests under
resolution 1452 (2002), and extending the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for a
further period of 18 months]
[on taking note with interest of the best practices & methods contained in the report of the Informal Working Group
on General Issues of sanctions (S/2006/997) & requesting subsidiary bodies to take note as well.]
[on establishment of a focal point within the Secretariat to receive de‐listing requests and directs the relevant
sanctions committees to revise their guidelines accordingly]
[on requesting the Secretary‐General to take the necessary steps to increase cooperation between the United
Nations and Interpol]
[on extending mandate of the 1540 Committee for a further two years]
[on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and
security]
[Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]
[on prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts]
[on condemnation of terrorist attacks in Iraq]
[on reviewing the measures imposed by resolution 1267 (1999) with a view to their further strengthening in 17
months; providing definition of “associated with”, calling for submission of checklist, and requesting the Sec.‐Gen to
extend the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team for 17 months]
[on condemnation of terrorist attacks in London]
[on creation of working group to consider measures against individuals, groups and entities other than Al‐
Qaida/Taliban]
[Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, obliges States to refrain from supporting by any means non‐State
actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical
or biological weapons and their delivery systems]
[on creation of Counter‐Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)]
[on the bomb attacks in Madrid, Spain, on 11 March 2004]
[on further improving the implementation of resolution 1267 (1999), strengthening the mandate of the 1267
Committee and requesting the Secretary‐General to appoint an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
for 18 months (paras 1, 3, 6 & 7)]
[on the bomb attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, on 15 November 2003 and 20 November 2003]
[on the bomb attack in Bogota, Colombia]

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/raids-show-the-limits-of-us-militarystrikes.html?, October 6, 2013.
59 | P a g e
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017

61
33

International
Journal on Responsibility, Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018
International Journal on Responsibility, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 41

S/RES/1456(2003)
S/RES/1455(2003)
S/RES/1452(2002)
S/RES/1450(2002)

20 Jan 2003
17 Jan 2003
20 Dec 2002
13 Dec 2002

S/RES/1440(2002)
S/RES/1438(2002)
S/RES/1377(2001)
S/RES/1373(2001)
S/RES/1368(2001)

24 Oct 2002
14 Oct 2002
12 Nov 2001
28 Sept 2001
12 Sept 2001

S/RES/1363(2001)

30 July 2001

S/RES/1333(2000)
S/RES/1269(1999)
S/RES/1267(1999)
S/RES/1214(1998)
S/RES/1189(1998)
S/RES/1054(1996)

19 Dec.2000
19 Oct 1999
15 Oct 1999
8 Dec. 1998
13 Aug. 1998
26 April 1996

S/RES/1044(1996)

31 Jan. 1996

S/RES/731(1992)

19 Nov.
1992
31 Mar.
1992
3 April 1991
9 June 1989

S/RES/748(1992)
S/RES/687(1991)
S/RES/635(1989)

[on high‐level meeting of the Security Council on combating terrorism]
[on improving implementation of measures imposed by resolution 1267 (1999]
[on implementation of measures imposed by resolution 1267 (1999)]
[on condemning the terrorist bomb attack, in Kikambala, Kenya, and the attempted missile attack on the airline
departing Mombasa, Kenya, 28 November 2002]
[on condemning the act of taking hostages in Moscow, Russian Federation, on 23 October 2002]
[on the bomb attacks in Bali, Indonesia]
[on the adoption of declaration on the global effort to combat terrorism]
[on international cooperation to combat threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]
[condemning the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania, United
States of America]
[on the establishment of a mechanism to monitor the implementation of measures imposed by resolutions 1267
(1999) and 1333 (2000)]
[on measures against the Taliban]
[on international cooperation in the fight against terrorism]
[on measures against the Taliban]
[on the situation in Afghanistan]
[on the terrorist bomb attacks of 7 Aug. 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania]
[on sanctions against the Sudan in connection with non‐compliance with Security Council resolution 1044 (1996)
demanding extradition to Ethiopia of the three suspects wanted in connection with assassination attempt on
President Mubarak of Egypt]
[calling upon the Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination
attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt]
[on the destruction of Pan American flight 103 and Union des transports aériens flights 772]
[on sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya]
[on restoration of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait]
[on marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection]

Sources: Various United Nations Documentations compiled by Author (M.G. Pufong)

Table 4: International Counter-Terrorism Conventions, Pre and Post 9/11
Table 4
1

2

3

4

International Counter terrorism Conventions Pre and Post 9/11*

Terrorism Convention, Purpose & Date of Passage
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed On Board Aircraft (1963) (Tokyo
Convention on aviation safety)
(Aircraft Convention)
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft (Hague Convention, 1970) aircraft
hijackings)
(Unlawful Seizure Convention)

Summary of Major content of each instrument
Applies to acts affecting in‐flight safety;
Authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed
or is about to commit such an act, when necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft;
Requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander.
Makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight [to] "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to]
seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so;
Requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe penalties;"
Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution;
Requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought under the convention.

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971) (Montreal
Convention) (applies to acts of aviation sabotage such
as bombings aboard aircraft in flight) (Civil Aviation
Convention)
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
(1973) (Outlaws attacks on senior government
officials and diplomats)
(Diplomatic Agents Convention)

Makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that
act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; to place an explosive device on an aircraft; and to attempt such acts or be an accomplice of a
person who performs or attempts to perform such acts;
Requires parties to the convention to make offences punishable by "severe penalties;"
Requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution
Defines internationally protected person as a Head of State, a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a representative or official of a state or of an international
organization who is entitled to special protection from attack under international law;
Requires each party to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature," the intentional
murder, kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises,
the private accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting
participation as an accomplice;"
Provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third
party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this
Convention;"
Criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, etc., of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to
cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage;

5

Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979)
(Hostages Convention)
(Hostages Convention)

6

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (1980) (Nuclear Materials Convention)
(combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material)
(Nuclear Materials Convention)
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation (1988).
Extends & Supplement to the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation i.e., (Civil Aviation
Convention)

7

Extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation.

60 | P a g e
http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/ijr/vol1/iss2/1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/ijr/vol1/iss2/4

62
34

International
Journal onetResponsibility,
Vol. I Issue 1.2 (May) 2018
Pufong: Terror, Insecurity,
al.:
State
Volume
Responsibility
1, Issue 2and Challenges: Yesterda

8

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (1988)
Applies to terrorist activities on ships) (Maritime
Convention)

9

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the
Continental Shelf (1988) (applies to terrorist activities
on fixed offshore platforms) (Fixed Platform
Protocol)

10

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for
the Purpose of Detection (1991) (Provides for
chemical marking to facilitate detection of plastic
explosives, e.g., to combat aircraft sabotage)
(Plastic Explosives Convention)

11

Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing
(1997)
(Terrorist Bombing Convention)

12

Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism (1999)
(Terrorist Financing Convention)

Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established against international
aviation;
Makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an
act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or
substance aboard a ship; & other acts against the safety of ships;
2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
Criminalizes the use of a ship as a device to further an act of terrorism;
Criminalizes the transport on board a ship various materials knowing that they are intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or
serious injury or damage to further an act of terrorism;
Criminalizes the transporting on board a ship of persons who have committed an act of terrorism; and
Introduces procedures for governing the boarding of a ship believed to have committed an offence under the Convention.
Establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against
international aviation;

Designed to control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am 103
bombing);
Parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control over "unmarked" plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain one
of the detection agents described in the Technical Annex to the treaty;
Generally speaking, each party must, among other things: take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of
unmarked plastic explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of its territory; exercise strict and effective control
over possession and transfer of unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry‐into‐force of the convention; ensure that all stocks of such
unmarked explosives not held by the military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within three years;
take necessary measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police, are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered
permanently ineffective within fifteen years; and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the
date‐of‐entry into force of the convention for that state.
Creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various
defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place

Requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or indirect, though groups claiming to have
charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gun running;
Commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts;
Provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with
other states on a case‐by‐case basis. Bank secrecy will no longer be justification for refusing to cooperate.
13.
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Covers a broad range of acts and possible targets, including nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors;
Terrorism(2005)
Covers threats and attempts to commit such crimes or to participate in them, as an accomplice;
(Nuclear Terrorism Convention)
Stipulates that offenders shall be either extradited or prosecuted;
Encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal
investigations and extradition proceedings; and
Deals with both crisis situations (assisting States to solve the situation) and post‐crisis situations (rendering nuclear material safe through the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
14.
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft as a weapon to cause death, injury or damage;
Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010)
Criminalizes the act of using civil aircraft to discharge biological, chemical and nuclear (BCN) weapons or similar substances to cause death, injury
(Beijing Convention)
or damage, or the act of using such substances to attack civil aircraft;
Criminalizes the act of unlawful transport of BCN weapons or certain related material;
Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the
A cyber‐attack on air navigation facilities constitutes an offence;
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at
A threat to commit an offence may be an offence by itself, if the threat is credible.
Beijing, (September 10, 2010) (Doc 9959).
Conspiracy to commit an offence, or its equivalence, is punishable
The listed 14 major multilateral conventions and protocols above deal with terrorism and related to State responsibilities for combating terrorism. Provided are brief summary of each these instruments. In addition to
these summaries, most of them provide that state parties to each establish criminal jurisdiction over offenders (where the offences take place, or in some cases, the state of nationality of the perpetrator or victims).
Although most UN Member State may not yet be party to these instruments, or better yet implementing them, other instruments may be relevant to particular circumstances such as bilateral extradition treaties. The
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations are notable examples. Moreover, number of important UN Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on
international terrorism also specify how to deal with specific incidents. For full text of any of these conventions see United Nations Treaty Collection, conventions on terrorism;
*see Universal Conventions and Protocols against Terrorism, http://web.archive.org/web/20070128120500/http:/www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism_convention_overview.html
Sources: United Nations Documentations and Various Sources. Compiled and structured here by author (M.G. Pufong)

Lessons from Cases, Events and Incidents
State responsibility and State duty today: The lessons drawn are at best
ambiguous but in the end, one can draw some obvious positive trends from the
cases, events and incidents presented in this article.
The first lesson on “self-defense” is that in the post 9/11 world, most
NATO countries, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the UN
Security Council have all recognized that terrorist attacks by any violent nonState Actor located within a State or otherwise, present sufficient enough cause
to use force for self-defense. To follow that position Tables 3 and 4 provides a
detail listing of UN resolutions and explanation in the area of terrorism. Table
3 or example provide a listing of Security Council Measures adopted on aspects
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of United Nations focus on terrorism from 1999 through 2014. It is comforting
to see that the United Nation has been in the forefront. Also, Table 4 is a listing
of 14 International Conventions and protocols initiated by the United Nations
dealing with terrorism and related to state responsibilities for combating
terrorism.
These conventions and protocols all relate to state responsibilities for
combating terrorism, and are provided in a familiar format. Typically they: (1)

define a particular type of terrorist violence as an offence/crime under the
convention (i.e., the seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or violence); (2)
require member State Parties to penalize that activity/conduct in their domestic
law; (3)identify certain bases upon which the member State are responsible or
required to establish jurisdiction over the defined offence (territoriality or
nationality); and (4) create an obligation on member State parties in which a
suspect is found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence and/or

to refer the offence for prosecution if the member state party does not extradite
pursuant to other provisions of the convention. The last element is the principle
of no safe haven for terrorists where for example, Security Council Resolution
1373 of September 28, 2001 mandates the Member State in which a suspect is
found to establish jurisdiction over the convention offence as an essential
anti-terrorism obligation on Member States.
The second lesson is on “State Responsibility” and is on the recognition
that in spite the seeming prevalence of terrorist acts perpetrated by violent nonState Actors in the post 9/11, international law requires that victim States act
responsibly within prevailing rules and practices of international law. What this
means is that they obtain proper consent before launching attacks against nonstate actors located within the territory of another State. Lastly, that victim
States be mindful that the failure by host States to terminate terrorist groups'
activities within their territory or deny safe-haven does not effectively grant carte
blanche permission to use force. Under the traditional right of self-defense, the
legality for the any use of force must be established before any action is
contemplated. That is, where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown
that the host state is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the
threat, and (2) all means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to
the initial harm caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very
temporary and one that does not result in non-consensual occupation or
annexation of the State or territory. To most critics, very little has changed.
As in the past, the UN Charter continues to limits the use of force to
collective security however, one that is duly authorized by the Security Council
as provided under Chapter VII of that Charter. Under what can be termed as I
do here as the minimalist view of Article 51, self-defense is justified only as a
reaction to an armed attack in the most imminent of the circumstances.
Contrasting the minimalist view is what I also term as the post 9/11 maximalist
relaxed view of international affairs and especially Article 51. This view holds
that the Charter does not require that an armed attack is attributed to a State
actor in order for a victim state to invoke the right to self-defense for retaliation.
There is therefore no distinction between a State and a non-State actor. The
problem with the later maximalist view is that attacking a non-state actor within
another state will almost always require using military operations in the
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territory of that State. That being the case, if the host state does not grant
consent, then such any use of force on its territory is an act of aggression, and
therefore an illegal use of force consistent with UN Charter prohibition.
The collision course between the harsh reality of the real world fight
against terrorism and the danger it presents and the rule law is undeniable. Put
simply, the reality of the current infinite capacity of VNSA to launch armed
attacks against States defies the continued relevance or the strict adherence to
Article 51 of the UN Charter. To underscore the point using the IsraeliHezbollah conflict in 2006, Israel's use of force in the Lebanese territory was and
would be problematic. It will be if the acts of Hezbollah cannot be attributed to
any state or if the acts of Hezbollah are attributable to either Syria or Iran and
not Lebanon in light of Hezbollah’s occupational history in that country.
However, in the post 9/11 maximalist view of a relaxed view of the right of selfdefense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, Israel's campaign in Lebanon was
and is legal under international law.
Discussions & Conclusion
State responsibility and State duty in perspective: States unquestionably
remain sovereign entities whose power to do routine business in international
affairs are recognized and respected. However, States are less and less the sole
players on the international scene, and even much less so in armed conflicts. The
picture this conveys is that States do not have absolute power to control and do
not have absolute freedom to do as they please. Codified rules of State
responsibility are clear on this point. Also, the constraint imposed as displayed
by international humanitarian laws that structures and limits the conduct of war
cannot be underestimated. Contemporary application of immunity still premised
on the 1648 Westphalia understanding of sovereignty which positions the State
above all orders but its own, is waning at a faster rate. Yes the State does matter,
but only on those matters that are essential to statehood and no more.
The assessment presented in this article shows that current international
law admits the use of force against terrorist groups which is hardly attributable
to a specific State. This, of course, is an expansive view and therefore maximalist
on the matter. For example, in the post 9/11 world, while the use of force against
non-state actors in theory is permissible only under certain prescribed
circumstances, in practice it is far easier to use force today than was the case
twenty-five years ago. The US killing of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011
is a classic example, and so is the second regroup of US led coalition to after ISIS
in Iraq and Syria in 2014. Also the use of drones in Pakistan depended on the
inquiry into many features of context and appropriate application of principles
of reasonable necessity and proportionality but shows the ease to which States
can use force. The ease with which force is used today begs the question for
further explanation however in context specific situation.
In the post 9/11 international environment, force can be used in
particular instances, as in the case where the host State is unable or unwilling to
repress the non-state terrorist organization operating within its territory. This,
of course, suggests that all reasonable measures are taken prior to such a use of
force. Also, force can be used when a request for intervention has been made by
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the international community in order to fight or repel non-state groups within
the territory of a UN member state. In either case, the degree of force required
(and used) must be proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of
the threat.
Also as the assessment above shows, State practices also demonstrate
that in the face of mounting threat posed by a terrorist organizations and for
which there is a consensus at the international community, it is not necessary to
demonstrate a link between such non-state terrorist organizations and a
particular State. This suggests that one or more States can use force against
another State when the latter gives shelter to terrorist organizations in its
territory. This of course is the case only when the host State does not signal its
intent to repress the terrorist threat within its territory despite repeated
requests to do so by the victim state or the international community.
The United Nations Charter and the numerous initiatives taken by the
United Nations since late 1990s (see Table 2) also provides for self-defense
recourse to be used strictly for such a purpose. If for example, a Member State
were attacked or invaded by another Member state, the Victim State has the
right to resort to self-defense as provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has spoken on this matter. The Victim State
must demonstrate the involvement of the aggressive State according to strict
criteria identified by the ICJ and by the International Law Commission. That is,
where necessary and appropriate, (1) it must be shown that the aggressive state
is unwilling or unable to reduce or eliminate the source of the threat, and (2) all
means adopted and damage inflicted must be proportionate to the initial harm
caused to the victim state, and (3) any use of force is very temporary and one that
does not result in non-consensual occupation or annexation of the State or
territory.
Finally is the case of Failed States, that is, those meeting known
definitions of failed states used by terrorist organizations as a base from which
to inflict mayhem on other countries. As shown in the case of Lebanon in this
article, when State authorities are unable to exercise effective control over part
or the entire territory, as was the case of Lebanon during the Israeli-Hezbollah
conflict in 2006, they are fair game for intervention. And where terrorist
organizations are operating and using that territory as a launching ground,
Victim States do not need permission to invade such a sponsoring territory. That
is, Victim States do not need to seek further approval or meet the strict criteria
of informing the State harboring the VNSA where the attack is being launch.
The US killing of Osama Bin Laden, in spite of Pakistan’s avowed
partnership in the war on terror, is a case in point, and therefore, precedentsetting in light of the set of facts explaining their prior partnership. The use of
force is therefore permissible under such circumstances to the extent that such a
use is proportionate and necessary to deter the specific source of threat from the
host territory especially where the authorities are unable or unwilling to exercise
control over their territory or the terrorist group. In the end, the larger
prevailing message for accountability and state responsibility is that State
preferences, be they their sovereign prerogatives or assertions who uphold
similar rights, cannot operate to avoid adherence to the broader goal of
international security.
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